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In the health-care setting, parental decisions to size, shape, sculpt, and mine
children's bodies through the use of nontherapeutic medical and surgical
interventions are a matter ofparental choice except in extraordinary cases involving
grievous harm. This Article questions the assumption ofparental rights thatframes the
current paradigm for medical decision making for children. Focusing on cases
involving eye surgery, human growth hormone, liposuction, and growth stunting, I
argue that by allowing parents to subordinate their children's interests to their own,
the current paradigm distorts the parent-child relationship and objectifies children in
violation of the moral principle, deeply embedded in American legal tradition, that no
person, even a parent, may subordinate the life, liberty, or body of another for his or
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her own purposes. I propose an alternative. Pushing analogies developed in family
law and moral philosophy to respect children as complete but vulnerable human
beings, I develop a trust-based construct of the parent-child relationship, in which the
parents are assigned trustee-like powers and responsibilities over a child's welfare
andfuture interests and are charged with fiduciary-like duties to the child. Application
of the trust-based construct in the health-care setting separates medical decisions that
belong to parents from decisions that belong to children and those that should be
made by a neutral third party.
INTRODUCTION
U.S. law allows parents extraordinary power over their children's bodies. Parents
have used that power to westernize the eyes of their adoptive Asian children,' to
modify the facial features of children with Down Syndrome, 2 to inject human growth
hormone (HGH) into healthy children,3 to enlarge the breasts of or suck the fat from
teenagers,4 to attenuate the growth and remove the reproductive organs of a child with
disabilities, 5 and to remove bone marrow from a nine-year-old girl for use by a brother
1. Alicia Ouellette, Eyes Wide Open: Surgery to Westernize the Eyes of an Asian Child,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 2009, at 15, 15; Sandy Kobrin, Asian-Americans Criticize
Eyelid Surgery Craze, WOMEN'S ENEWS, Aug. 15, 2004, http://www.womensenews.org/
article.cfm/dyn/aid/1950.
2. See, e.g., Shlomo Kravetz, Aron Weller, Rivka Tennenbaum, David Tzuriel & Yael
Mintzker, Plastic Surgery on Children with Down Syndrome: Parent's Perceptions ofPhysical,
Personal, and Social Functioning, 13 RES. IN DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 145 (1992); Len
Leshin, Plastic Surgery in Children with Down Syndrome, DOWN SYNDROME: HEALTH ISSUES
(2000), http://www.ds-health.com/psurg.htm.
3. See David B. Allen & Norman Fost, hGHfor Short Stature: Ethical Issues Raised by
Expanded Access, 144 J. PEDIATRICS 648 (2004); Michael Freemark, Editorial, Growth
Hormone Treatment of "Idiopathic Short Stature": Not So Fast, 89 J. CLINICAL
ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 3138 (2004); Linda D. Voss, Growth Hormone Therapy for
the Short Normal Child: Who Needs It and Who Wants It? The Case Against Growth Hormone
Therapy, 136 J. PEDIATRICS 103, 103 (2000).
4. See Mary Duenwald, How Young is Too Young to Have a Nose Job and Breast
Implants?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2004, at F5; Marina Pisano, Liposuctionfor Girl, 12, Stirs
Debate, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEws, Dec. 5, 2006, at 1C, available at
http://www.mysanantonio.com/life/MYSA1 20506_ 1 P lipol e5605bhtml.html; Diana
Zuckerman & Anisha Abraham, Teenagers and Cosmetic Surgery: Focus on Breast
Augmentation andLiposuction, 43 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 318 (2008); Susan Kriemer, Teens
Getting Breast Implants for Graduation, WOMEN'S ENEws, June 6, 2004,
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfin/dyn/aid/1861/context/cover/; Cynthia McFadden &
Deborah Apton, Like Brother, Like Sister? More Teens Getting Controversial Surgery, ABC
NEWS, Nov. 15, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/DiabetesResource/story?id=
3870671 &page=l.
5. See Daniel F. Gunther & Douglas S. Diekema, Attenuating Growth in Children with
Profound Developmental Disability: A New Approach to an Old Dilemma, 160 ARCHIVES
PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 1013, 1014 (2006); DAVID R. CARLSON & DEBORAH A.
DORFMAN, WASH. PROT. & ADVOCACY SYS., INVESTIGATIVE REPORT REGARDING THE "ASHLEY
TREATMENT" (2007), available at http://www.disabilityrightswa.org/news-1/Investigative
%20Report/o2ORegarding/ 2Othe%2OAshley/o2OTreatment.pdf.
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who sexually abused her.6 To be sure, physicians or surgeons are the ones who
physically modify the child's body7 but they do so as agents of parents. And, in the
case of elective interventions, it is the parents who seek out medical or surgical
modifications, find a willing provider, and give their consent to size, shape, sculpt, or
mine8 their children's body for social, aesthetic, familial, or cultural reasons. I call
these "shaping cases, ' 9 and I find them troubling.
In bioethics and law, the traditional academic response to troubling cases involving
children is an in-depth analysis of the facts of a particular case or the intricacies of a
particular intervention to determine whether the intervention at issue is so harmful or
potentially harmful as to justify limiting parental choice.' 0 Indeed, I have conducted
harm-based analyses on some of the cases mentioned above." The typical analysis
weighs the risks of harm against the benefits of the procedure. Much ink is spilled
identifying harms and debating their significance. 12 Application of a harm-based
6. Douglas J. Opel & Douglas S. Diekema, The Case ofA.R.: The Ethics ofSibling Donor
Bone Marrow Transplantation Revisited, 17 J. CLNICAL ETHICs 207,208-09 (2006) (describing
a case in which a sibling was forced to donate bone marrow to save the life of a brother who
sexually abused her).
7. See infra Part III for an explanation about the relative responsibility of parents and
physicians in medical decision making for children.
8. A child's body is mined when it is used as a source of a valuable natural resource such
as bone marrow, an organ, or skin.
9. The name is borrowed from the Hastings Center, a major bioethics research institute,
which coined the term "shaping children" to describe the use of surgical interventions designed
with the purpose of "normalizing" child appearance. See Eric Parens, ThinkingAbout Surgically
Shaping Children, in SURGICALLY SHAPING CHILDREN: TECHNOLOGY, ETHICs AND THE PURSUIT
OF NORMALITY, at xiii (Eric Parens ed., 2006). I use the term "shaping cases" slightly differently.
Unlike the Hastings Center, which includes surgery to repair a cleft lip or palate as a shaping
case, I include as shaping cases only those involving the use of surgical or medical intervention
that provide no medical, therapeutic, or functional benefit to the child. I would argue that
surgery for a cleft lip or palate restores function to the child's face by allowing the face to
perform as intended as a tool of social entry.
10. See, e.g., Dov Fox, Safety, Efficacy, and Authenticity: The Gap Between Ethics and
Law in FDA Decisionmaking, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1135; Opel & Diekema, supra note 6, at
207; Therese Powers, Note, Race for Perfection: Children's Rights and Enhancement Drugs, 13
J.L. & HEALTH 141 (1998); Vita Maria Salvemini, Note, Idiopathic Short Stature or Just Plain
Short: Why the Federal Government Should Regulate the Administration of Human Growth
Hormone to Healthy Children, 38 GA. L. REV. 1105 (2004); Samuel J. Tilden, Ethical and
Legal Aspects of Using an Identical Twin as a Skin Transplant Donor for a Severely Burned
Minor, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 87 (2005).
11. See Ouellette, supra note 1, at 15; Alicia Ouellette, Growth Attenuation, Parental
Choice, and the Rights of Disabled Children: Lessons from the Ashley X Case, 8 HOUSTON J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 207 (2008), available at http://www.law.uh.edu/hjhlp/Issues/Vol_82/
Ouellette.pdf [hereinafter Ouellette, Lessons from the Ashley X Case].
12. See, e.g., Mark S. Frankel & Cristina J. Kapustij, Enhancing Humans, in FROM BIRTH
TO DEATH AND BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR
JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 55 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008) (providing an
analysis of the harms associated with enhancement technologies); Nancy Press, Genetic Testing
and Screening, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER
BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS, supra, at 73
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analysis is a valuable exercise. It ensures consideration of beneficence and justice as a
counterbalance to autonomy in ethical analysis. The debates about harm also broaden
our understanding of the physical, moral, and psychological stakes for children, as well
as fairness and justice implications for society, of specific medical interventions.3 But
the debates start by assuming parental rights to intervene, an assumption that
effectively limits the debate to value judgments about the results of, or benefits gained
by, a particular intervention.
This Article takes a different tack. Instead of focusing on a single case or
intervention, I focus on shaping cases generally. Instead of identifying and weighing
the harm or potential harms at stake for children, I ask what shaping cases tell us about
the contours of the relationship between parents and children. In other words, I focus
not on the ends sought by parents, but on the "human disposition [that shaping of
children] expresses and promotes." 14 1 adopt this approach because I believe that the
real problem with shaping cases lies in the assertion of parental power involved and the
medical provider's acquiescence to it, and I believe that offering an alternative frame
for discourse about medical decision making for children that questions, rather than
assumes, parental power may allow health law and bioethics to develop decision-
making processes that better protect children than does the traditional harm-based
framework.
An examination of shaping cases from the perspective of the parent-child
relationship reveals that shaping interventions are a product of a medical ethos and
"social world that prizes mastery and control"' 5 allowing parents to assert their will
onto their child in a way that may disrespect the child as a human being. Support for
this exercise of parental power is rooted in an understanding of children's bodies as a
form of property over which the parents have a possessory interest. Such a construct
distorts the parent-child relationship and objectifies children. I propose an alternative.
Building on models of the parent-child relationship developed in family law and moral
(discussing the benefits and harms of genetic testing); John William McDermott, Note, Growth
Attenuation in the Profoundly Developmentally Disabled: A Therapeutic Option or a
Socioeconomic Convenience?, 32 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 427 (2008) (describing the harms of
parental autonomy in child-rearing decisions that involve invasive medical procedures);
Christine Ryan, Note, Revisiting the Legal Standards That Govern Requests to Sterilize
Profoundly Incompetent Children: In Light of the "Ashley Treatment," Is a New Standard
Appropriate?, 77 FoIRHAm L. REv. 287 (2008) (discussing the risks and benefits of the "Ashley
Treatment").
13. See, e.g., Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical
Dilemma: Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous
Genitalia?, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 56-59 (2000) (analyzing the uncertain long-term
outcome of surgical treatment for intersex children and its impact on the children's right to an
open future); Karen Gruney, Sex and the Surgeon's Knife: The Family Court's Dilemma...
Informed Consent and the Specter of latrogenic Harm to Children With Intersex
Characteristics, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 625 (2007) (describing the physical, psychological, and
social implications of medical interventions for intersex children); Salvemini, supra note 10, at
1121-33 (exploring the risks of HGH treatment for healthy children).
14. Michael J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection: What's Wrong with Designer
Children, Bionic Athletes, and Genetic Engineering, in ETHICAL IssuEs IN MODERN MEDICINE:
CONTEMPORARY READINGS IN BIOETHICs 890, 894 (7th ed. 2009).
15. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION: ETHIcs IN THE AGE OF GENEnc
ENGINEERING 86 (2007).
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philosophy, I suggest a trust-based construct of the parent-child relationship for
medicine, in which the parent has trustee-like powers and responsibilities over a child's
welfare and developing rights, as well as fiduciary-like duties to the child.
Part I of this Article describes cases in which parents exercised their power to shape
their children through elective medical and surgical interventions: a case involving a
white father who used surgery to reshape the eyes of his adopted Asian child; another
in which parents used human growth hormone to add a few inches onto the adult height
of their young son; a third in which a mother consented to liposuction for her twelve-
year-old daughter; and the case of Ashley X, a young girl with profound disabilities
whose parents elected to stunt her growth and remove her breasts and uterus in order to
continue caring for her at home. Part II sets forth the legal parameters currently
governing medical decision making for children. Part III makes the case that the
medical or surgical shaping of children is problematic because it objectifies children's
bodies based on a distorted understanding of the parent-child relationship as one in
which the parent has possessory rights over a child's body. Part IV explores, from the
family law perspective, an understanding of an adult's relationship with children as one
of trusteeship, not ownership. Part V argues for a conceptual reconstruction of the
parent-child relationship in medical decision making for children that adopts from
family law and moral philosophy the notion of a parent as a trustee of the child's
welfare and future interests. Part VI applies the trust-based model to the four focus
cases to show that importing a trust-based model of parenting into the health-care
setting can help distinguish parental choices that belong to the parent from those that
should be reserved for the child and those that cannot be entrusted to either parent or
child. Finally, Part VII acknowledges the limitations of a trust-based approach.
I. SCULPTING, SHAPING, AND SIZING CHILDREN: Focus CASES
The use of physical interventions to size and shape children is not new. For
centuries parents bound the feet of their young daughters to keep them dainty. 6 With
the help of doctors, parents have stunted the growth of tall girls by administering high
doses of estrogen, 17 used surgery to "correct" ambiguous genitalia,' 8 and lengthened
limbs on dwarf children.' 9 In some cultures, parents elect to cut the genitals of young
16. See DOROTHY Ko, CINDERELLA'S SISTERS: A REVISIONIST HISTORY OF FOOTBINDING
(2005); WANG PING, ACHING FOR BEAUTY: FOOTBINDING IN CHINA (2000). For an excellent
historical overview of surgeries used in different cultural contexts, see KATHY DAVIS, DUBIOUS
EQUALITIES & EMBODIED DIFFERENCES: CULTURAL STUDIES ON COSMETIC SURGERY (2003).
17. SuSAN COHEN & CHRISTINE COSGROVE, NORMAL AT ANY COST: TALL GRLS, SHORT
Boys, AND THE MEDICAL INDUSTRY'S QUEST TO MANIPULATE HEIGHT 3-51 (2009); WILLIAM N.
TAYLOR, HORMONAL MANIPULATION: A NEW ERA OF MONSTROUS ATHLETES 107-08 (1985).
18. Alice D. Dreger, A History of Intersexuality: From the Age of Gonads to the Age of
Consent, 9 J. CLINICAL ETInCS 345, 349-50 (1998). Many first person narratives recounting
individual traumas are contained in INTERSEX IN THE AGE OF ETHCS (Alice D. Dreger ed.,
1999).
19. E.g., Emily Sullivan Stanford, My Shoe Size Stayed the Same: Maintaining a Positive
Sense of Identity with Achondroplasia and Limb-Lengthening Surgeries, in SURGICALLY
SHAPING CHILDREN, supra note 9, at 29.
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girls to conform to cultural norms. 20 This section briefly describes four modem cases in
which parents elected to shape, sculpt, and size their children's bodies through elective
surgical and medical interventions. Choosing the focus cases for the Article was
difficult.21 The four I discuss, eye shaping, hormones for height, liposuction, and
growth attenuation, represent a good cross section of the shaping work that is currently
being done on or to children. The four cases vary in important ways. They range from
the frivolous to the profound. They involve young and older children, adopted and
natural-born children, and fully capacitated and profoundly disabled children. Each of
the distinctions between the cases-from the intervention's intrusiveness to the child's
age to the child's mental capacity--could arguably make a moral, ethical, or legal
difference in the analysis of an individual case.
I want to suggest the opposite: the similarities between these four very different
cases are more important than the differences, and the things that make them similar
should make a difference in medicine and in the law. How are these cases the same?
These are true shaping cases. The purpose of the procedures was to modify the child's
body for aesthetic, social, or cultural reasons, not to address or correct an underlying
illness or physical impairment. They were all products of parental judgments about a
child's best interests, but the interventions were in no way therapeutic.22 They were
medically unnecessary, physically invasive, and undeniably risky. They were, by
definition, elective, and were effected at the parent's request, not on the
recommendation of a physician. Another commonality between the cases is that none is
reported in case law. My reports about them come from serendipity, medical journals,
and the Internet.23
A. Westernizing Asian Eyes
I heard about the first case while attending a presentation at a local hospital. There,
a white plastic surgeon spoke glowingly about surgery he elected for his adopted Asian
daughter. She came to his family with eyes that he deemed problematic because, like
the eyes of many people of Asian descent, his daughter's eyes lacked a fold in the
upper eyelid. As a result, he thought she looked sleepy and he was concerned that her
20. See L. Amede Obiora, Bridges and Barricades: Rethinking Polemics and Intransigence
in the Campaign Against Female Circumcision, 47 CASE. W. RES. L. REv. 275, 277 (1997).
21. Early drafts of the Article included a case involving a parent's decision to make a minor
child a skin donor for a sibling. I replaced that case with the HGH case because the physical
risks to the child in the HGH case are arguably lower than the risks in the other cases. The skin
donation case involved physical risks comparable to liposuction and eye-shaping surgery.
22. Therapeutic interventions are those aimed at preventing or treating disease or injury, or
returning functionality to what is normal for the species. See ROBERT M. VEATCH, THE BAsIcs OF
BIOETHICS 155-57 (2d ed. 2000); Lisa Fishbayn, "Not Quite One Gender or the Other":
Marriage Law and the Containment of Gender Trouble in the United Kingdom, 15 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 413,440 (describing the purpose and history of categorizing surgeries
as "therapeutic").
23. Although I am primarily concerned about whether the power to elect the procedures is
one that should rest with parents in the first place, my case descriptions include a brief synopsis
of the risks and benefits. The alternative in all the cases was to do nothing, as none of the
features altered threatened the child's physical health.
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eyes closed completely when she smiled. He proudly reported that he had solved the
problem by having his daughter's eyes surgically shaped through a procedure called
blepharoplasty. He was thrilled with the results. His beautiful daughter now has big
round eyes that stay open and shine, even when she smiles, and make her look more
like her new western family. The adoptive father seemed certain that his decision to use
surgery to shape his daughter's eyes would improve her life.24
Although blepharoplasty is among the most common procedures performed by
25plastic surgeons in the United States, it carries risks. Originally designed "specifically
to westernize the eyelid at the patient's request, '2 6 the procedure is done on an
outpatient basis. After the patient is sedated and anesthetized, the surgeon makes an
incision above the eyelid and removes excessive skin, tissue under the skin, and fat
pads.27 The surgeon then sutures the incision and packs the eye with a light dressing.
Once the wound heals, the incision disappears in the newly formed crease. In addition
to the usual risks of surgery, eye-shaping surgery poses the risk of hematoma,
asymmetry, and drooping. 28 Recovery may be uncomfortable. A woman who had the
procedure as an adult said that after the operation "she had to sleep in a semi-standing
position and 'when you lay down, it feels like the swelling is burying you.'
29
B. Hormones for Stature
In the summer of 2004, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved HGH
treatments for children who are very short but otherwise healthy.30 Although the FDA
approved the use of HGH in healthy children only when the child's predicted adult
height is at or below five feet for females, and five feet, four inches for males, or 2.25
standard deviations below the mean for the child's age and sex, 31 the FDA decision
24. I described the same case in a short essay in the Hastings Center Report. Ouellette,
supra note 1. Some of the information reported here is copied from that paper.
25. The American Society of Plastic Surgeons reports that eyelid surgery was performed
221,000 times in 2008. See AM. Soc'Y OF PLASTIC SURGEONS, 2009 REPORT OF THE 2008
STATIsTICs: NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE OF PLASTIC SURGERY STATISTICS 7 (2009). Of those,
2072 procedures involved children between thirteen and nineteen years old. Id. at 12. The
American Society of Plastic Surgeons does not keep statistics on the use of cosmetic surgeries
on children under the age of thirteen. Id.
26. Charles S. Lee, Blepharoplasty, Asian, EMEDICINE, (2000), http://www.emedicine.com/
plastic/topic425.htm; see also ELIZABETH HAIKEN, VENUS ENvY: A HISTORY OF COSMETIC
SURGERY 200-09 (1997) (describing the history of surgeries designed to westernize Asian
features).
27. See Lee, supra note 26; see also John A. McCurdy, Upper Blepharoplasty in the Asian
Patient: The 'Double Eyelid' Operation, 13 FACIAL PLAST. SURG. CLIN. NORTH AM. 47 (2005).
28. FACIAL PLASTIC AND RECONSTRUCTiVE SURGERY, 195 (Ira D. Papel et al. eds., 2d ed.
2002).
29. Christina Valhouli, Asian Eyes: Some Turn to Glue or Surgery for a New "Look",
SALON, Feb. 16, 2000, http://archive.salon.com/health/feature/2000/02/16/asian eyes/
index.html.
30. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Approves Humatropefor Short Stature, July 25,2003,
DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/news/fda-approves-humatrope-short-stature-3357.html.
31. Id.
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does not regulate off-label prescription of HGH to children who do not fall within the
FDA guidelines.
3 2
As a result, pediatricians today "hear parents ask for [H]GH because their son (and
it's usually sons) is as 'short as I was in grade school,' or 'is the shortest one on the
team.' 33 Other parents "are seeking the drug-and no doubt obtaining it-for use in
children who are of normal height and even for use in some who are tall, in the hopes
that the drug will enable them to grow tall enough to become successful basketball
players. 34 Although some doctors refuse parental requests for HGH for healthy
children, others defer to parental choice. 35 Thus a parent with financial means who can
find a willing provider can administer HGH to his son to give him a better shot at
making the varsity basketball team.
A course of treatment with HGH requires subcutaneous injections three to six times
a week over the course of four or five years.36 On average, the hundreds of injections
will increase a child's adult height by about one and one-half half inches. 37 The
treatment will not make a short person tall; a child who would have been five feet tall
as an adult without the injections would likely be five feet, one and one-half inches or
five feet, two inches after treatment. And the treatment's long-term risks are not well
understood. It is clear that the treatment may cause musculoskeletal pain and
aggravation of kidney problems. 38 It poses long-term risks of diabetes, hypertension,
and cancer.39
In addition to physical risks, the artificially administered HGH may cause children
psychological or psychosocial harm. Although parents and physicians often believe
that giving a child an inch or two extra of adult height will increase a child's self-
32. "Off-label use" is the use or prescription of a medical device or drug for a purpose that
is legal but has not received FDA approval. See James E. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-
Label Use and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
71, 71-76 (1998).
33. Rahul K. Parikh, Growth Hormone for Kids: Normal Boys and Girls are Taking
Growth Hormone for Being Short. That's a Bad Prescription., SALON, Oct. 31, 2008,
http://www.salon.com/env/vital-signs/2008/l0/31/growthhormoneskids/ (providing a
pediatrician's view on the use of HGH in healthy kids).
34. Maxwell J. Mehlman, How Will We Regulate Genetic Enhancement?, 34 WAK FOREST
L. REv 671, 679 (1999) (explaining that obtaining statistics on such off label uses is
impossible).
35. See id.; see also Salvemini, supra note 10, at 1107-08 (collating statistics about the use
of HGH in healthy children).
36. PHYSICIAN'S COMM. FOR RESPONSIBLE MED., CONCERNS ABOUT GROWTH HORMONE
EXPERIMENTS IN SHORT CHILDREN, available at http://www.pcrm.org/resch/PDFs/hum_
hormone.pdf; David B. Allen & Norman C. Fost, Growth Hormone Therapyfor Short Stature:
Panacea or Pandora's Box, 117 J. PEDIATRICS 16, 19 (1990).
37. See Ellen Werber Leschek, Susan R. Rose, Jack A. Yanovski, James F. Troendle,
Charmian A. Quigley, John J. Chipman, Brenda J. Crowe, Judith L. Ross, Fernando G. Cassorla,
Werner F. Blum, Gordon B. Cutler, Jr. & Jeffirey Baron, Effect of Growth Hormone Treatment
on Adult Height in Peripubertal Children with Idiopathic Short Stature: A Randomized,
Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled Trial, 89 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 3140,
3145 (2004).
38. Salvemini, supra note 10, at 1123-25.
39. See id.
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esteem and social status, the evidence is to the contrary. Studies show that in the long
run, the psychosocial adaptation and self-esteem of treated children is comparable to a
placebo group, and repeated injections increase the child's negative self-image and
associated stigmatization of height as a defining feature of the child's existence.
4 0
C. Liposuction on a Twelve Year Old
Brooke Bates was twelve years old when her parents persuaded a plastic surgeon to
use liposuction to remove thirty-five pounds of fat and fluid from her body.41 Brooke
and her parents were initially thrilled with the results, but the surgery did not keep
Brooke from putting weight back on. When the weight returned in less than a year, the
parents returned Brooke to the operating room for a tummy tuck.42 A year later, her
parents took her to Mexico for gastric lap band surgery after their family doctor
advised against the procedure.
43
Brooke may be the youngest known person to have been shaped by liposuction,4
but she is not the only child on whom the procedure has been used. The American
Society of Plastic Surgeons reports 3979 cases of liposuction on patients between the
ages of thirteen and nineteen in 2008.4 5 Liposuction is not an effective treatment for
obesity in any patient, adult or child.46 Clinical studies have demonstrated that
lipoplasty does not reduce the risk of heart disease or diabetes and that it does not
increase metabolism. 47 It is an intervention designed to sculpt contours into a person's
body by removing pockets of fat.48 The surgery itself poses the risk of infection,
embolism, puncture wounds in the organs, seroma, nerve compression, changes in
40. See id. at 1124; Linda D. Voss, Is Short Stature a Problem? The Psychological View,
155 EuR. J. ENDOCRINOLOGY 39,42-43 (2006). For a fascinating explanation of how attention
to a condition may make a condition stigmatizing and, therefore, a negative factor in a child's
self-esteem, see Brenda Major & Laurie T. O'Brien, The Social Psychology of Stigma, 56 ANN.
REv. PSYCHOL. 393, 394 (2005) (explaining, among other things, how stigma is an attribute that
discredits an individual "reducing him or her from a whole and usual person to a tainted and
discounted one"). For a fascinating account of the lingering psychosocial effects of HGH
treatment on a child with a hormonal deficiency, see David Davis, Growing Pains,
http://www.mad-cow.org/dec early news.html.
41. Allison Adato, Anne Lang & Darla Atlas, Too YoungforLipo?, PEOPLE, Nov. 13,2006,
at 131, available at http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20059928,00.html
(explaining that plastic surgeon Robert Ersek only capitulated to the parents' request for surgery
after learning that the father was sick with cancer).
42. Id. at 133.
43. Too Young? Teen Gets Stomach Band After Lipo, ABC NEWS.coM, Aug. 15, 2007,
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/OnCall/Story?id=3481336&page=l.
44. Adato et al., supra note 41, at 132.
45. See AM. Soc'y OF PLAsTIC SURGEONS, supra note 25, at 12.
46. See Adato et al., supra note 41, at 132.
47. E.g., Samuel Klein, Luigi Fontana, V. Leroy Young, Andrew R. Coggan, Charles Kilo,
Bruce W. Patterson & B. Selma Mohammed, Absence of an Effect of Liposuction on Insulin
Action and Risk Factors for Coronary Heart Disease, 350 N. ENG. J. MED. 2549 (2004).
48. Adato et al., supra note 41
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sensation, swelling, skin necrosis, bums, fluid imbalance, toxicity from anesthesia, and
even death.49
D. Growth Stunting
The case of Ashley X may be the most highly debated of the shaping cases
discussed in this Article. Ashley X was a patient at the University of Washington's
Children's Hospital and Regional Medical Center in 2004.50 Ashley had profound
developmental disabilities of unknown etiology.5' For reasons the doctors could not
explain, her mental development had never advanced beyond that of an infant.
5 2
When Ashley was six years old, her parents began to fear for their daughter's long-
term future.53 Future growth would, the parents feared, make it impossible for them to
care for their daughter at home.5 4 The parents consulted Ashley's physicians about
their options.55 Her mother suggested a plan for growth attenuation and surgical
stunting of Ashley's sexual development.5 6 The plan had three main components. The
doctors would perform a hysterectomy, a mastectomy, 7 and administer high doses of
58estrogen. The hysterectomy would prevent Ashley from menstruating; the
mastectomy would prevent her from developing mature breast tissue; and the estrogen
therapy would prevent her from reaching her projected adult height and weight. 9 The
goal of the procedures was to keep Ashley in a child-sized body to allow the parents to
49. Food & Drug Admin., What Are the Risks or Complications Associated with
Liposuction?,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/SurgeryandLifeSupport/uc
m070191.htm.
50. For a more thorough description of Ashley's case, see Ouellette, Lessons from the
Ashley X Case, supra note 11, at 210-17. The case was initially made public by Ashley's
doctors. See Gunther & Diekema, supra note 5, at 1014.
51. Gunther & Diekema, supra note 5, at 1014.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See CARLSON & DORFMAN, supra note 5, at 7. Ashley's parents refer to the mastectomy
part of the intervention by the more benign sounding "breast bud removal." Ashley's Mom and
Dad, The "Ashley Treatment ": Towards a Better Quality ofLife for "Pillow Angels, "Mar. 25,
2007, at 5, http://pillowangel.org/Ashley/o20Treatment%20v7.pdf [hereinafter Parents' Blog].
The Children's Hospital Ethics Committee, however, described the protocol in its ethics opinion
regarding this intervention as a "mastectomy." DAVID R. CARLSON & DEBORAH A. DORFMAN,
WASH. PROT. & ADVOCACY Sys., INVESTIGATIVE REPORT REGARDING THE "ASHLEY TREATMENT"
app. I (2007) (Exhibit L: Special CHRMC Ethics Committee Meeting/Consultation (May
2004)), available at http://www.disabilityrightswa.org/news- l/Investigative%20Report/*
20Regarding%2Othe%2OAshley/2OTreatmentExhibits%20K%20-%20T.pdf [hereinafter
Committee Meeting].
58. CARLsON & DoRFMAN, supra note 5, at 7.
59. Id. at 11-12.
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continue to take care of her at home. 6° The parents did not want Ashley's care "in the
hands of strangers. 61
The physicians supported the parents' choice, but recognized that the intervention
was unprecedented.62 As a result, they referred the case to the hospital's ethics
63committee, which met with the family, Ashley, and Ashley's doctors "for over an
hour. ' 64 The committee considered the potential risks and benefits of each of the three
main components of the proposed intervention and ultimately reached consensus that
the administration of high dose estrogen, hysterectomy, and mastectomy were all
ethically appropriate: "[I]t was the consensus of the Committee members that the
potential long term benefit to Ashley herself outweighed the risks; and that the
procedures/interventions would improve her quality of life, facilitate home care, and
avoid institutionalization in the foreseeable future."6 5 Having identified no reason to
interfere with parental authority, the committee left the decision to proceed in the
, 66
parents' hands. Ashley's parents consented, and the interventions were implemented
without judicial review.67 The surgeons removed Ashley's uterus and her breast buds in
an "uneventful" surgery. 6' They also removed her appendix69 and administered several
courses of high dose estrogen.
70
Each intervention carried physical risks. The potential risks of high dose estrogen
included "increased potential for deep vein thrombosis, possible weight gain, [and]
possible nausea."'71 The risks of a hysterectomy include "anesthesia, surgery[,] and
post-operative recovery period, with the additional short term discomfort and
suffering. 72 The physical risks of mastectomy were "minimal" at the time of Ashley's
surgery because her breast development was "rudimentary."
73
60. Id.
61. Gunther & Diekema, supra note 5, at 1014.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. Committee Meeting, supra note 57.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See CARLSON & DORFMAN, supra note 5, at 14. The hospital later admitted that it erred
by failing to seek judicial review of the decision to remove Ashley's uterus. Carol M. Ostrom,
Children's Hospital Says It Should Have Gone to Court in Case of Disabled 6-Year-Old,
SEATLE TIMES.COM, May 8, 2007, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htmlIocalnews/
2003698112_webchildrens08m.html. Ashley's physicians and the surgeon who performed the
hysterectomy relied on the opinion of Ashley's parents' lawyer that court review was
unnecessary because sterilization was not the sole purpose of the procedure. See CARLSON &
DORFMAN, supra note 5, at 14.
68. Gunther & Diekema, supra note 5, at 1014.
69. Parents' Blog, supra note 57, at 5 ("The surgeon also performed an appendectomy
during the surgery, since there is a chance of 5% of developing appendicitis in the general
population, and this additional procedure presented no additional risk. If Ashley's appendix acts
up, she would not be able to communicate the resulting pain. An inflamed appendix could
rupture before we would know what was going on, causing significant complication.").
70. See Gunther & Diekema, supra note 5, at 1014.
71. Committee Meeting, supra note 57.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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II. THE LAW, MEDICINE, PARENTAL RIGHTS, AND CHILDREN'S BODIES
The focus cases involved the use of medicine, hormones, or surgery to modify a
child's body despite the absence of a medical need for modification. The interventions
all caused the child some kind of physical damage and they were all optional. That
shaping procedures are invasive, irreversible, potentially dangerous, and done for
reasons other than therapy makes them different from other parental decisions that
shape a child.74 But current law does not recognize that difference. None ofthe shaping
cases described in the previous section went to court. Only one was the subject of any
legal regulation.75 Although they raise questions about parental rights, parental
obligations, and child rights, the law is essentially indifferent to shaping cases.
A. Background Law
U.S. law recognizes the right of competent adults to make their own medical
decisions.76 Grounded in constitutional and common law, the right to choose among
medical options allows people to refuse treatment, even lifesaving treatment, and to
elect treatment, even dangerous cosmetic procedures. Children are obviously not
competent adults. While ethicists insist that young children must assent and teenagers
consent to medical procedures, 77 the law places decisionmaking for children squarely
in their parents' or guardians' hands with very few exceptions.78 The general rule,
applicable in almost all situations, is that a parent is free to sort among alternatives and
elect the course of treatment based on his or her assessment of the child's best
74. See infra Part III.C.
75. Washington law arguably required court review of the decision to perform a
hysterectomy on Ashley. A decision of the Washington Supreme Court requires court review of
decisions to sterilize people with developmental disabilities. In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608
P.2d 635, 640 (Wash. 1980). There is some debate about the application of that case to Ashley's
case because her parents were not seeking to sterilize Ashley but to decrease the risks of
thrombosis caused by the estrogen treatment and to prevent Ashley from becoming upset at the
sight of her own menstrual blood. But following the media storm of attention on Ashley's case,
the hospital admitted it should have sought court review of the decision to remove Ashley's
uterus. See Ostrom, supra note 67. As I have argued before, however, the need for court review
of the hysterectomy in Ashley's case is somewhat beside the point. Such review would not likely
have changed the outcome in Ashley's case, and it will not be required in future growth
attenuation cases on boys or cases involving only high dose estrogen. See Ouellette, Lessons
from the Ashley X Case, supra note 11, at 229.
76. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-80 (1990) (recognizing the
right of a competent adult to make her own health-care decisions, but upholding state
regulations over decisionmaking for incompetent adults).
77. See, e.g., Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose Body Is It Anyway? An Updated Model of
Healthcare Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 251
(2005); Andrew Popper, Averting Malpractice by Information: Informed Consent in the
Pediatric Environment, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 819, 832 (1998); Lawrence Schlam & Joseph P.
Wood, Informed Consent to the Medical Treatment of Minors: Law and Practice, 10 HEALTH
MATRIX 141,148-52 (2000).
78. For a discussion of the exceptions, see infra text accompanying notes 95-101.
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interests.79 In other words, parental decisions to use medically unnecessary surgeries
for aesthetic or social reasons are treated like parental decisions to attend church or
select a school.8 0 As a practical matter, the law allows parents with financial means8'
and access to a willing provider to make and implement decisions to size or sculpt their
children.
The broad discretion afforded parents in medical cases is rooted in family
autonomy. The Supreme Court has recognized the "family as a unit with broad parental
authority over minor children"8 2 in which the parents have the authority to raise
children as the parents see fit. The right to familial autonomy allows parents to make
most decisions about the care and keeping of children without government oversight or
interference.8 3 Of course, parental rights are not unfettered. Although "custody, care,
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents," 4 parental rights are tempered by
children's rights and interests and the states' interests in children's health and safety.
As a result, states may intervene on behalf of abused or neglected children, 5 limit
parental authority to send their children to work,8 6 and require that children be
vaccinated. 7
79. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979); see also infra Part II.C.
80. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 603-04.
81. Parents pay for elective cosmetic procedures out of pocket. Ashley's health insurer paid
for her care. CARLSON & DORFMAN, supra note 5, at 15 (citing Parents' Blog, supra note 57, at
6).
82. Parham, 442 U.S. at 602.
83. "Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among
associational rights this Court has ranked as 'of basic importance in our society,' rights sheltered
by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or
disrespect." M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (citation omitted) (quoting Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971)). Parents therefore have a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745,753-54 (1982); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,649-52 (1972) ("The rights
to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights of man'
.... (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923))); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("[T]he custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first [with] the parents."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (stating that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to
establish a home and bring up children); Hurlman v. Rice, 927 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1991); Van
Emrik v. Chemung County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 911 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1990).
84. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
85. The state has a profound interest in the welfare of the child, particularly his or her being
sheltered from abuse. In "'emergency' circumstances," Hurlman, 927 F.2d at 80 (citing Robison
v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987)), a child may be taken into custody by a responsible
state official without court authorization or parental consent. "Emergency circumstances mean
circumstances in which the child is immediately threatened with harm." Id. (citing Robison v.
Via, 821 F.2d 913,922 (2d Cir. 1987)). "[T]he mere 'possibility' of danger" is not enough. Id.
at 81. If it were, officers would always be justified in seizing a child without a court order
whenever there was suspicion that the child might have been abused. See id. The law thus seeks
to strike a balance among the rights and interests of parents, children, and the state. See
Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 739 (10th Cir. 1997); Robison, 821 F.2d at 920.
86. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 226-29 (1972) (holding that while the
state had a compelling interest in "universal compulsory education," Amish children were
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In areas of law outside health care, children's rights and voices are taking on
increasingly important roles.88 Indeed, in some areas of family law, children's rights
and welfare trump parental rights.8 9 Legal theorists describe a shift in the law's
understanding of the parent-child relationship from a traditional hierarchical model to
other models that give varying levels of respect to children as autonomous beings. 90
The traditional hierarchical model of family is firmly ensconced in the health-care
setting, however. The Supreme Court has made clear that despite the impact on a
child's liberty interest, parents "can and must" make medical judgments for children.91
State statutes give parents the power to consent to medical, surgical, dental, and
psychiatric treatment.92 In most cases, the child's wishes are essentially irrelevant. 93
As the Supreme Court stated: "The fact that a child may balk at hospitalization or
allowed to quit schooling and begin working after graduating eighth grade because of their
parents' religious belief in preparing for life in the Amish community); Sturges & Burn Mfg.
Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 325-26 (1913) (upholding prohibition against work by
children under the age of sixteen in hazardous occupations). "Constitutional rights do not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority.
Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (citing Breed v. Jones,
421 U.S. 519 (1975); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)).
87. E.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,656 (1995) ("For their own good
and that of their classmates, public school children are routinely required... to be vaccinated
against various diseases."); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176-77 (1922) (deciding that a statute
mandating compulsory vaccination for schoolchildren was within the state's police power to
regulate public health).
88. E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 1-3 (requiring juvenile courts to afford children due
process rights to counsel, notice, and cross examination); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584
(1974) (holding that children have a due process right to present their case before being
suspended from school).
89. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (upholding
Pennsylvania statute requiring a pregnant minor seeking an abortion to obtain consent of one
parent or guardian, or to seek judicial bypass of consent requirement); In re Appeal in Pima
County Juvenile Severance Action No. S-113432, 872 P.2d 1240 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
that a child may petition to sever parental rights); Peregood v. Cosmides, 663 So.2d 665 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (granting a child standing to challenge adoption by his biological mother).
90. E.g., Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and the
Parent-Child Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REv. 345, 373-78 (1997) (describing three models
through which the courts evaluate decision making within the parent-child relationship: the
traditional model, where parents are in exclusive control over their children's decisions; the
transforming-traditional model, where there are exceptions to the parents' exclusive control in
certain situations; and the individualist model, where children "become free to make their own
decisions and bear responsibility for the consequences of their actions"); see also infra Part IV
(discussing the application of alternative models to medical decision making).
91. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
92. E.g., N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW §2504(2) (McKinney 2009).
93. See, e.g., Parham, 442 U.S. at 603 ("Most children, even in adolescence, simply are not
able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions, including their need for medical care
or treatment."); Powers v. Floyd, 904 S.W.2d 713, 714 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the
mother had the power to consent to an abortion for her daughter and that the physician had no
duty to disclose the nature of the procedure to the daughter).
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complain about a parental refusal to provide cosmetic surgery does not diminish the
parents' authority to decide what is best for [the] child." 94
Of course, parental discretion over medical treatment is limited in some medical
cases. Parents are not always free to refuse life-sustaining treatment for a child,95 and
parents' say over a minor's decision to have an abortion is limited.96 Some states give
children the right to decide about contraception and drug treatment,97 and others give
decision-making power to mature and emancipated minors.98 Parental rights are also
limited with respect to particular medical choices. For example, federal law prohibits
genital cutting 99 and limits parental authority to enroll children in experimental
protocols, 00 and some states subject parental decisions to sterilize or institutionalize a
child to review by a neutral third party or court.'0 '
B. Application in Shaping Cases
Parental choice is the rule in shaping cases. The exceptions do not apply. The use of
shaping interventions does not deprive a child of lifesaving treatments or involve drug
treatment, abortion, or institutionalization. Although shaping interventions implicate a
child's rights to bodily integrity, they do so no more than other cases involving the use
of medical and surgical interventions. And where a parent chooses to use medicine or
surgery for a child (as opposed to when a parent refuses medicine or surgery) courts
are generally unwilling to consider the child's best interests when the desired
intervention has the support of even one licensed medical provider.'
0 2
94. Parham, 442 U.S. at 604.
95. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass. 1978) (ordering a child undergo
chemotherapy over the parents' objections because the treatment had minimal side effects
compared to the alternative of not providing treatment, and would save the child from certain
death within months); ALAN MEIsEL& KATHY CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-
OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING §§ 9.01-10.12 (3d. ed. 2004) (discussing cases in which parents have
been allowed to withhold care and special rules applicable to seriously ill newborns).
96. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (finding
unconstitutional a state statute that granted parents an absolute veto over a minor child's
decision to have an abortion).
97. See generally Schlam & Wood, supra note 77, at 165-66.
98. Schlam & Wood, supra note 77, at 165.
99. 18 U.S.C. § 116 (2006).
100. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401-.409 (2008) (requiring Institutional Review Board approval of
research protocols involving children and strictly limiting non-therapeutic research protocols
that parents may elect for their children).
101. E.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 11.92.043(5) (West 2007); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608
P.2d 635, 641 (Wash. 1980).
102. See In re Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that the court would not
interfere with parents' decision to forgo conventional chemotherapy for their eight-year-old son
who suffered from Hodgkin's disease and treat him with laetrile and a special diet instead
because a single provider supported their choice); In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765 (Wash. 1942)
(holding that the mother was free to refuse surgery to remove her child's deformed arm despite
the recommendation by two physicians that it should be removed for the child's health because
both courses of action entailed risk).
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Thus, the extent to which the parental-choice system actually protects a child's best
interests is highly dependent on parental and medical judgment. In exercising their
judgment, doctors are highly deferential to parental choice. As one well-known
physician ethicist teaches, the real question in medical cases involving children is not
identifying which medical alternatives represent the best interests of the child but rather
"identifying a harm threshold below which parental decisions will not be tolerated."'
0 3
The applicable "harm threshold" varies from physician to physician. Although many
doctors refuse to participate in ethically questionable or potentially risky interventions,
other physicians are tolerant of physical risk for social or aesthetic benefit. Risk-taking
and deferential doctors are free to carry out parental wishes unless the parental decision
directly imperils a child's life, reproductive rights, or physical freedom. As a result, a
parent who has found a willing medical provider is essentially free to shape his or her
child.
The requirement that parents find a willing provider is hardly an obstacle to the
exercise of shaping power. Cosmetic surgeons are especially likely to meet the
demands of parents for invasive shaping interventions. Unlike pediatricians who
measure appropriate medical options by weighing the medical efficacy of a proposed
intervention, cosmetic or plastic surgeons are, due to the very nature of their practice,
unconcerned with medical efficacy. Plastic surgery's goal is aesthetic and social
improvement. The American Academy of Facial Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery
code of ethics says only that "[a] member must not perform a surgical operation that is
not calculated to improve or benefit the patient."' 4 The degree to which cosmetic or
social interventions benefit a patient is in the eye of the beholder. The shaping
procedures used on all four children in the focus cases were calculated by the parents
to improve or benefit their children, and providers were willing to provide each
intervention. So long as some providers believe that such subjective aesthetic, social,
or familial improvements justify the use of shaping interventions on children, courts
are unlikely to interfere with parental choices to use them.
That is not to say that no court would ever find the affirmative use of cosmetic
shaping procedure on a child abusive. Imagine, for example, a parent who had been
transformed through extreme plastic surgeries into something resembling a lizard.'
0 5
Now imagine that our lizard man had a child, and he wanted his child to look more like
him, to be a lizard boy. If the father found a plastic surgeon to split his child's
tongue, 106 the father's actions might well be deemed abusive (and the surgeon's a
103. Douglas S. Diekema, Parental Refusals of Medical Treatment: The Harm Principle as
Threshold for State Intervention, 25 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICs 243, 243 (2004).
104. AM. ACAD. OF FACIAL PLASTIC AND RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY, CODE OF ETHIcs 8
(2000), http://www.aafprs.org/Code Of Ethics.pdf.
105. See, e.g., The Lizardman, http://www.thelizardman.com/ (showing picture of man
surgically modified to look like a lizard); Infoplasticsurgery.com, Tongue Splitting Surgery,
http://www.infoplasticsurgery.com/facial/tonguesplitting.html (advertising a board certified
plastic surgeon who provides tongue splitting surgery in a nonjudgmental atmosphere); Unusual
Goals: Extreme Plastic Surgery, http://www.plastic-surgeon-directory.com/extreme-plastic-
surgery.html (describing procedures done to effectuate a man's desire to look like a lizard, such
as having five Teflon horns subdermally implanted above each of his eyes to form homed
ridges, four of his teeth filed into sharp fangs, and his tongue bifurcated).
106. Take, for example, Dr. Jean Loftus, who provides tongue-splitting services "to ensure
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ground for professional discipline) because, under all objective standards, splitting a
person's tongue willjeopardize his health and welfare by interfering with the ability to
eat and by inflicting a stigmatizing condition. By contrast, eye-shaping surgery and
liposuction are medically accepted interventions. Given the near complete deference
courts afford medical providers and parents over medical judgments, it is unlikely a
court would find the provision of these popular services to be abusive or grounds for
professional discipline.
C. Room for Regulation
The broad discretion given parents to shape their children's bodies through
medically unnecessary medical and surgical interventions is not constitutionally
mandated. The same concerns that justify limitations on parental discretion over
involuntary institutionalization and sterilization of minors-the magnitude of the
potential harm, the potential conflict of interest on the part of the parents, and the
potential for abuse of the interventions 1 7 -would justify limiting parental authority in
shaping cases.
As discussed, parental rights over care and custody of children are not unlimited.
They must be balanced against children's rights and states' interests in protecting
children. The Supreme Court clarified the delicate balance between parental rights and
child rights when it comes to medical decision making for a child in Parham v. JR.
10 8
Although Parham is frequently cited as a strong authority for parental rights and as the
case that reversed the trend toward protecting children's rights, it is actually a case in
which the Court found enough risk of error in parental judgment about what is in a
child's best interests that it held that the constitution required procedural protections
for the child before the parental decision could be implemented.' °9
In Parham, the Court considered a challenge to a Georgia law that allowed parents
to institutionalize children with psychiatric illness.' 0 The plaintiff was a six-year-old
boy whose mother resorted to forced institutionalization after her efforts to manage the
child at home failed.' A lawsuit was instituted on the child's behalf alleging that he
had a due process right to a full adversarial hearing before his constitutional right to
safety for the public. Unless this procedure is offered by a reputable surgeon, those seeking it
may be forced to have it in unclean and unsafe environments." Infoplasticsurgery.com, supra,
note 105.
107. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (weighing risk of harm to child and potential for
abuse as relevant factors for overriding parental choice); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d
635,641 (Wash. 1980) (holding that parent did not have authority to consent to sterilization of
her minor daughter because sterilization impinged significantly and permanently on fundamental
liberty interests of the child; rather, the child had to be represented by an independent third party
in an adversarial hearing to establish whether sterilization was appropriate); Hart v. Brown, 289
A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (holding that parents could consent to kidney transplant from
one identical twin to the other where transplant was necessary for survival of one twin, risks
were negligible, and parents' motivation had been reviewed by neutral third parties, including
the court).
108. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
109. See id. at 606-08.
110. Id. at584.
111. See id. at 589-90.
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liberty could be restrained. 12 The trial court agreed with the child rights advocates, but
the Supreme Court reversed. 113 The Supreme Court recognized that medical
interventions implicate children's liberty interests,1l4 but also made it clear that the
child's rights are, in most cases, coextensive with the parents' rights over the child."15
Thus, the Court said the primary right to make medical decisions rests with the parent,
and parents are entitled to a presumption that their decisions are in the best interests of
the child.'16 But, the Court also recognized expressly "[t]hat some parents 'may at
times be acting against the interests of their children."'
117
In the case of forced institutionalization of the child, the Court found good reason to
reverse the presumption that parents act in a child's best interests. Concerned with the
possibility that parental choices to institutionalize children may be made to benefit an
overwrought parent rather than the child, the Court turned to "consideration of what
process protects adequately the child's constitutional rights by reducing risks of error
without unduly trenching on traditional parental authority.""' 8 The Court concluded
that "[t]he risk of error inherent in the parental decision to have a child institutionalized
for mental health care is sufficiently great that some kind of inquiry should be made by
a 'neutral factfinder' to determine whether the statutory requirements for admission are
satisfied."' 19
Thus, despite its notoriety as a parents' rights case, Parham clearly stands for the
proposition that states may-and sometimes must-act to protect children from their
parents' medical decisions, especially when the parents' interests may not be
coextensive with the child's.120 In shaping cases, the parents' interests cannot be
112. Id. at 584.
113. Id. at585.
114. Id. at 600-01; see also Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2003) ("[I]nvoluntary
medical treatment raises questions of clear constitutional importance."); Riggins v. Nevada, 504
U.S. 127, 133-34 (1992); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990);
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985)
(finding "[a] compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body... implicates expectations
of privacy and security" of great magnitude).
115. Parham, 442 U.S. at601-02.
116. Id. at602.
117. Id. (quoting Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1047-48 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated
and remanded, 431 U.S. 119 (1977)).
118. Id. at 606.
119. Id.
120. See id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 1 1.92.043(5) (West 2007) (requiring independent
third-party review of parental decisions to sterilize or institutionalize their children); Hart v.
Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (holding that parents could consent to kidney
transplant from one identical twin to the other where transplant was necessary for survival of
one twin, risks were negligible, and parents' motivation had been reviewed by neutral third
parties, including the court); Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (authorizing
parental consent to kidney transplant from the daughter, a fourteen-year-old with Down
syndrome, to the son, suffering from end-stage renal disease, because the son would continue to
deteriorate without the transplant and the daughter would receive psychological benefits from
donation); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 641 (Wash. 1980) (holding that parent
did not have authority to consent to sterilization of her minor daughter because sterilization
impinged significantly and permanently on fundamental liberty interests of the child; rather, the
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assumed to be coextensive with the child's. Shaping procedures are physically
invasive, carry with them significant risk, and may be used to satisfy the parents'
aesthetic or social preference. As a result, restricting medical or parenting practices to
prevent the misuse of shaping interventions is necessary to protect children.
III. WHAT IS REALLY WRONG WITH MEDICAL AND SURGICAL SHAPING OF
CHILDREN?
There is much at stake for children subjected to medical or surgical shaping. There
is physical harm--skin is cut or pierced; tissue or organs are removed; and bodies are
anesthetized or injected with hormones. There is physical risk of nerve damage, cancer,
diabetes, hypertension, and death, and there is a psychological risk of stigma and injury
to identity. And there may be harm to the children's communities, such as the creation
of a permanent underclass and misallocation of precious health-care resources. In any
other context, cutting, piercing, and injecting children would constitute abuse, ' 2' but in
shaping cases the interventions are presumed to be in the children's best interests
because parents and doctors are involved. 122 Even so, the harm-based analysis
traditionally applied to evaluate the appropriateness of particular medical interventions
for children-the search for harm so grievous as to justify overriding parental choice-
could well justify the regulation of certain shaping procedures. For example, the
physical risks and stigmatizing effects of daily HGH injections arguably outweigh the
benefits from an additional inch or two of height. 2 3 Justice concerns and moral harms
weigh against the growth attenuation interventions used on Ashley. 124 These harms are
child had to be represented by an independent third party in an adversarial hearing to establish
whether sterilization was appropriate).
121. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) defines abuse as the
infliction of "physical injury (ranging from minor bruises to severe fractures or death) as a result
of punching, beating, kicking, biting, shaking, throwing, stabbing, choking, hitting (with a hand,
stick, strap, or other object), burning, or otherwise harming a child." CHILD WELFARE
INFORMATION GATEWAY, WHAT IS CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT? 2 (2008), available at
http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/whatiscan.pdf. HHS regulations further provide
that an "injury is considered abuse regardless of whether the caretaker intended to hurt the
child." Id. Cutting a child's eyelids, injecting drugs hundreds of times, cutting a child's
abdomen, and removing tissue or organs all fall within this definition.
122. "[E]ven though it otherwise meets the definition of abuse, it is permissible to cut a child
in the context of a surgical procedure when the intrusion is designed to alleviate the patient's
own greater physical harm." Doriane L. Coleman, The Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, 57
DuKE L.J. 517, 553 (2007).
123. See Fox, supra note 10, at 1144-46, 1153-59, 1193-96 (arguing for regulation on this
basis).
124. See, e.g., William Peace, Protest from a Bad Cripple: Ashley Unlawfully Sterilized,
COUNTERPUNCH, May 26,2007, http://counterpunch.org/peace05262007.html (asking "[wihat is
next? Amputate the legs of paralyzed people because they are at risk for skin problems and
blood clots?"); William Peace, Protest from a Bad Cripple: The Ashley Treatment and the
Making of a Pillow Angel, COUNTERPUNCH, Jan. 18, 2007, http://www.counterpunch.org/
peace0I 182007.html (arguing the Ashley case sends the message that "disabled people are not
human-they are profoundly flawed and extreme measures will be taken to transform their
bodies"); Dave Reynolds, Advocates Speak Out and Call for Investigations over "Ashley
Treatment ", INCLusIoN DAILY ExPREss, Jan. 12, 2007, http://www.inclusiondaily.com/archives
/07/01/12/011207waashleyx.htm (stating that"' [b]enevolence' and 'good intentions' have often
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at least as consequential as those that justify limitations on the parental choice to enroll
a child in nontherapeutic research protocols or to institutionalize a child. 25
It is my position, however, that a harm-based analysis is of limited use in shaping
cases. First, harm-based analyses are necessarily procedure or case specific. Second,
they have little traction in practice, especially when directed at the overuse or misuse of
medical or surgical intervention (as opposed to underuse).126 Third, and most
importantly, harm-based arguments do not get to the root of the problem. They take as
a given that, absent grievous harm or death, parents have a right to modify a child's
body. The assumption of parental rights applies equally to medical or surgical
modifications made to improve a child's health as it does to modifications made to
satisfy a parent's own aesthetic or social preferences.
The assumption that parents have such broad powers over a child's body should be
questioned. 27 No one other than a parent has the power to use a child's body for their
own purposes, and the notion that a parent has a right to alter a child's body is
inconsistent with principles deeply embedded in law and moral theory--that people are
not property; that people are entitled to respect and dignity; and that no person has a
right to exercise complete dominion over the body of another.'
28
A. The Nonsubordination Principle as a Limit on Individual Rights
In order to assess the proper scope of parental rights, it is helpful to evaluate both
the moral and legal status of adult persons generally and the extent to which the moral
status of one person may limit the rights of another. Adults are human persons who
had disastrous consequences for the disability community. Throughout history, 'for their own
good' has motivated and justified discrimination against [the disabled community]").
125. At stake for children in research protocols are physical and moral harm. See Gwendolyn
Johnson, Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc.: The Court of Appeals of Maryland
Distinguishes Special Relationships That May Arise to the Level of a Contractual Relationship
Between Researchers andNon-Therapeutic Research Participants, 9 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 72,
72-73 (2001); Coleman, supra note 122, at 530-45. At stake for children who are
institutionalized are confinement and stigma. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,600-01 (1979).
126. Compare In re Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that the court would
not interfere with parents' decision to forgo conventional chemotherapy for their eight-year-old
son who suffered from Hodgkin's disease and treat him with laetrile and a special diet instead),
with In re Sampson, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972) (ordering that a child undergo facial surgery
and receive blood transfusions despite the mother's religious objection).
127. I am by no means the first person to question the traditional understanding of
parenthood that underlies the current paradigm for medical decision making for children. See,
e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 297-98 (1988)
(describing the traditional view of "parenthood as exchange" and describing a new construction
of the relationship between parent and child, away from parents' rights and towards parents'
responsibility for constructing a nurturing relationship with their child); James G. Dwyer,
Parents'Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine ofParents'Rights, 82 CAL.
L. REv. 1371, 1374 (1994) (arguing that the "preferred justifications for parental rights are...
unsound" and that the "law confer[s] on parents simply a child-rearingprivilege, limited in its
scope to actions and decisions not inconsistent with the child's temporal interests" (emphasis in
original)).
128. See Dwyer, supra note 127, at 1405 ("[I]t is illegitimate to construe an individual's
rights to include an entitlement to exercise extensive control over another person, or any control
over a non-consenting person apart from self-defensive measures." (emphasis in original)).
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have a moral status that demands respect, dignity, and freedom from arbitrary
treatment. The law respects that moral status by affording individuals rights to self-
determination,12 9 bodily integrity, 130 and freedom from confinement. 3' The right to
self-determination gives people broad power to direct the course of their own personal
and professional lives.1 But the right to self-determination is not so broad as to allow
its exercise to deny the moral status and corresponding rights of another person. While
an individual has a constitutionally protected right to self-determination, that right is
limited by the rights of other persons to bodily integrity, self-determination, and
freedom from confinement. 133 In other words, a person's right to self-determination
does not include a right to subordinate another person's life, liberty, or body for his
own purposes.
Application of this "nonsubordination principle"' 34 is clear with adults. The most
obvious example, of course, is the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against slavery
and involuntary servitude, 135 which the courts have interpreted to apply beyond the
129. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (recognizing that "the
liberty... guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment] ... denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized ... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men." (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)) (alteration in original)).
130. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) ("[T]he
Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions
about family and parenthood as well as bodily integrity .... ).
131. E.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,600 (1979) ("[A] child, in common with adults, has
a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment ....").
132. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923) (stating that liberty includes the "right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized.., as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men").
133. See, e.g., W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630 (1943) (noting that it is
conflicts between the freedoms of one party and "rights asserted by any other individual...
which most frequently require intervention of the State to determine where the rights of one end
and those of another begin").
134. 1 am using this term to define the limitations that one person's liberty interests place on
the exercise of another's. James G. Dwyer uses the term "non-subjection principle" in his article
Parents 'Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents 'Rights, Dwyer,
supra note 127, at 1412, to define a similar concept. Others refer to nonsubordination theory
and an antisubjugation principle to describe the law's abhorrence of castes and a principle which
prohibits the systematic subordination of a particular group based on a single trait. See, e.g.,
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 107, 157 (1976);
see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 1438, 1514 (2d ed. 1988)
(referring to an "antisubjugation principle"); Erin E. Goodsell, Toward Real Workplace
Equality: Nonsubordination and Title VII Sex-Stereotyping Jurisprudence, 23 Wis. J.L. GENDER
& Soc'Y 41, 46 (2008) (applying nonsubordination theory to Title VII); Cass R. Sunstein, The
Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2410,2428-29 (1994) (arguing against laws that maintain
second-class citizenship, or lower-caste status, for blacks or women).
135. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
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formal institution of slavery to "control by which the personal service of one man is
disposed of or coerced for another's benefit."' 36 The prohibition against slavery and
involuntary servitude preserves the respect and dignity of one person at the expense of
another's liberty interests. For example, the right to contract is a protected liberty
interest,137 but courts routinely refuse to enforce specific performance of personal
service contracts to avoid subjugating one person to the will of another.1 38
The nonsubordination principle also plays a role in criminal and civil laws that
prohibit physical abuse and battery.' 39 No matter how powerful one person's desire to
force another to submit to his will, laws prohibiting abuse and battery limit a person's
right of self-determination by preventing him from subjugating another's body for his
own purposes. 140
The principle that one individual's right to self-determination does not entitle that
person to dominate another, and its converse, that every individual is entitled to full
respect and dignity, is reflected in the modem understanding of the marital
relationship. Although women were once denied the rights attendant their human
status, the law's evolving understanding of all persons as complete human beings has
resulted in serious limits on the power of husbands to dominate their wives. Husbands
can no longer rape their wives with impunity. '41 In the abortion context, the "moral fact
that a person belongs to himself and not to others nor to society as a whole,"' 142 means
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
136. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911).
137. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (acknowledging the
individual right to contract as a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 cmt. a (1981) ("A court will refuse to
grant specific performance of a contract for service or supervision that is personal in nature. The
refusal is based in part upon the undesirability of compelling the continuance of personal
association after disputes have arisen and confidence and loyalty are gone and, in some
instances, of imposing what might seem like involuntary servitude.").
139. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.00-.12 (McKinney2009) (prohibiting assault against
another person); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.52 (McKinney 2009) (prohibiting forcible touching of
another); CAL. PENAL CODE § § 242.0-243.10 (West 2008) (prohibiting various forms of battery);
see also United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276, 1280-83 (1988) ("[A] parent's contract allowing
a third party to burn, assault or torture his child is void.").
140. See King, 840 F.2d at 1283.
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits an individual from selling himself into
bondage, and it likewise prohibits a family from selling its child into bondage. The
Western legal tradition prohibits contracts consenting in advance to suffer assaults
and other criminal wrongs. They are void as against public policy. They do not
insulate the wrongdoer from civil and criminal liability. Similarly a parent's
contract allowing a third person to bum, assault or torture his child is void.
Id. (citation omitted).
141. E.g., People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 572-73 (N.Y. 1989) (.'[n]owhere in the
common-law world-[or] in any modem society-is a woman regarded as chattel or demanded
by denial of a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole
human being."' (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980) (alterations in
original)).
142. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777 n.5
(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring), overruled in nonrelevant part by Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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that a husband's right to direct his own reproductive destiny cannot extinguish a
woman's right to make "choices central to personal dignity and autonomy.',
43
The nonsubordination principle applies even to adults who are "naturally suited to
governance by others[,]'"144 due to incapacity or incarceration. In Cruzan, for example,
the Supreme Court denied the parents' claim that they possessed the right to decide to
terminate life-sustaining treatment for their adult daughter, who lacked capacity to
make her own decisions because of injuries sustained in an accident. 45 The Court
reasoned that the decision whether to live or die is so personal to the individual
affected, that the state need not "repose judgment on these matters with anyone but the
patient."' 46 In other words, a state could reasonably decide that certain decisions are so
personal they belong to a particular individual only, even when the individual to whom
they belong lacks capacity to make her own choices. Likewise, the Court has
recognized that adults with profound retardation have protected interests in bodily
safety and freedom from restraint that limit their caregivers' actions.' 47 And despite the
diminished liberty of prisoners, they retain "a significant liberty interest in avoiding the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment'1 48 that prevents the state from exercising unrestrained
dominion over their bodies.
B. Children as Persons, Parental Rights
Application of the nonsubordination principle to the parent-child relationship is
complicated by the well-established right of parents to direct a child's upbringing.149
Parental rights allow parents a degree of control over other persons that would be
impermissible in any other relationship. But it would be a moral and legal mistake to
assume that the law's recognition of parental rights entitles parents to control a child's
body or to make decisions for a child that belongs to the child's adult self. Parental
rights spring not from some ownership interest in the child, but from liberty interests in
self-determination,' 50 and a conception of "family privacy" that includes "not simply a
143. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (striking down spousal notification rule).
144. Dwyer, supra note 127, at 1416.
145. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
146. Id. at 286.
147. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (finding constitutionally protected rights to
reasonably safe confinement conditions and freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints where
mentally retarded patient received injuries while involuntarily committed to a state institution).
148. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990). "The forcible injection of
medication into a nonconsenting person's body represents a substantial interference with that
person's liberty." Id. at 229.
149. Parents have the rights "to bring up [a] child in the way he should go." Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944). "It is cardinal... that the custody, care, and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Id. at 166. The "primary role of parents
in the upbringing of their children is ... established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972). But see Dwyer, supra note 127
(arguing that children's rights, rather than parents' rights, should be the focus of the law).
150. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that
liberty in the Constitution implies "freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life
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policy of minimum state intervention but also a presumption of parental autonomy."' 51
Just as the right to self-determination is consistently limited by the rights and moral
status of others, parental rights are also limited by the rights and moral status of
children.' 52 As persons, children are entitled to whatever degree of respect and dignity
their vulnerable status allows. "Our law views the child as an individual with the
dignity and humanity of other individuals, not as property.' 53 Neither the custodial
status, nor the biological relationship of parents to children, nor the zone of privacy
that surrounds families gives parents a right to use, sacrifice, or invade a child's body
for their own purposes, or to make decisions for a child that belong to the adult the
child will become.1
54
Even the cases explicitly recognizing parental rights can be understood to apply the
nonsubordination principle to limit the scope of parental powers in terms of the child's
future and present liberty interests. For example, when the Supreme Court upheld a
child labor law against a challenge based in part on parental authority to direct the
religious upbringing of a child, it famously explained that "[p]arents may be free to
become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of
full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves."'155 Thus, the
Court recognized parental power over the religious upbringing of a child but limited its
reach at the point at which its assertion would interfere with the ability of the child to
exercise her own rights in the future. Likewise, the well recognized power ofparents to
direct their children's education' 56 is not so broad as to allow parents to deny children
respecting... the... upbringing of children" (emphasis in original)).
151. In re Marriage of Mentry, 190 Cal. Rptr. 843, 848 (Cal. App. 1983); see, e.g., Mentry,
190 Cal. Rptr. at 847-48 (explaining that "[t]he vast majority of matters concerning the
upbringing of children must be left to the conscience, patience, and self restraint of father and
mother. No end of difficulties would arise should judges try to tell parents how to bring up their
children."); Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1062 (1978) (recognizing that "natural
rights" of parents encompass "an entire 'private realm of family life which must be afforded
protection from unwarranted State interference"' (quoting Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,
255-56 (1978))).
152. See Custody ofa Minor, 379 N.E.2d at 1063 ("[W]here a child's well-being is placed in
issue, 'it is not the rights of parents that are chiefly to be considered. The first and paramount
duty is to consult the welfare of the child.' On a proper showing that parental conduct threatens
a child's well-being, the interests of the State and of the individual child may mandate
intervention." (quoting Purinton v. Jamrock, 80 N.E. 802, 805 (Mass. 1907)) (footnote
omitted)).
153. United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276, 1283 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing Ford v. Ford, 371
U.S. 187, 193 (1962)).
154. See id. ("Neither religion nor parental consent can save the Salem witch trials of
children or the sale of a daughter into prostitution or the Padrone system of child labor or the
House of Judah system of child beatings.").
155. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
156. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,534-35 (1925) (recognizing the right
of parents to send their school-age children to parochial or private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) (recognizing "the power of parents to control the education of their
own").
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an education altogether. 157 Education, acknowledged the Court, promotes children's
future autonomy by preparing "individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient
participants in society,"' 5 8 and compulsory education laws ensure that parents do not
deny children the opportunity to become self-sufficient participants in society. And in
Parham, where the Court emphasized parental rights to make medical choices for
children, the Court limited parental power to ensure against erroneous imposition of
unnecessary or improper medical treatment where there was a risk that exercise of
parental power could subordinate the child's interest in freedom from unnecessary
medical treatment and confinement to the parent's own interests in restraining a
problem child. 159
The nonsubordination principle is further reflected in laws that authorize
intervention on behalf of neglected or abused children, 160 prevent parents from
withholding necessary medical treatment, 161 curtail parental authority to sterilize their
children,' 62 and limit parental power "to deny children exposure to ideas and
experiences they may later need as independent and autonomous adults.' 63 These laws
all limit parental power at the point at which its exercise would subordinate the child's
life or body to the parents' interests. The principle is most visibly at play in the laws
regulating use of children as research subjects and in the few instances in which
parental decisions to use one child as an organ or tissue donor for another have reached
the courts. 164 Regardless of parental desire to inculcate children in a value system
prizing altruism, or a desire to profit from their children's bodies, parents may not
freely authorize the use of their children as subjects in nontherapeutic research
protocols. 165 Applicable regulations were promulgated to protect children as persons
157. See Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[T]he scope of a
parent's right to direct the.., education of children... does not include a right to exempt one's
child from school requirements.").
158. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
159. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979) (requiring a "probe [of] the child's
background using all available sources, including but not limited to, parents, schools, and other
social agencies. Of course, the review must also include an interview with the child").
160. E.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106g (2009) (defining child abuse); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384-b
(McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2010).
161. See, e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 498-508
(W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
162. See, e.g., Conservatorship of Valerie N. v. Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760 (Cal. 1985) (en
banc) (denying a parent's right to sterilize an adult child without medical necessity); Ruby v.
Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361, 367 (D. Conn. 1978) ("[Parents] may neither veto nor give valid
consent to the sterilization of their children.").
163. Parham, 442 U.S. at 631 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Commonwealth v. Renfrew, 126 N.E.2d 109 (Mass. 1955)); cf Meyerkorth v. State, 115
N.W.2d 585 (Neb. 1962) (upholding a statute that set minimum requirements for teacher
qualifications and student attendance against a freedom of religion challenge), appeal dismissed,
372 U.S. 705 (1963); Auster v. Weberman, 100 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct. 1950), aff'd, 102
N.Y.S.2d 418, affid, 302 N.Y. 855, appeal dismissed, 342 U.S. 884 (1951)).
164. See, e.g., Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1972).
165. 45 C.F.R. § 46.404-07 (2009) (restricting the use of healthy children in research to
studies that involve no more than "minimal risk"); see also Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst.,
Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 843-44 (Md. 2001) (declaring invalid parental consent given to the use of
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with moral and legal status in the wake of a public ethical debate66 that began with the
revelation that Nazi doctors experimented on children during World War II and
reached a critical point when it was learned that healthy but developmentally disabled
children at the Willowbrook School in New York were being fed the hepatitis virus as
part of a study designed to understand the course of the disease and the possibilities for
vaccination.167 The debate about human experimentation gave rise to the National
Commission for Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavior Science's
Belmont Report,168 the document that establishes ethical parameters for
experimentation on human subjects, and forms the basis of federal regulations. The
children in nontherapeutic research protocols involving more than minimal risk); T.D. v. N.Y.
State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (invalidating state
regulations that allowed more than minimal risk on children).
166. For a thorough discussion of the debate and the historical evolution of ethical codes
governing human experimentation, see BEYOND CONSENT: SEEKING JUSTICE IN RESEARCH
(Jeffrey P. Kahn, Anna C. Mastroianni & Jeremy Sugarman eds., 1998). For discussions focused
on children in research, see LAINIE FRIEDMAN Ross, CHILDREN IN MEDICAL RESEARCH: ACCESS
VERSUS PROTECTION (2006); Randall Baldwin Clark, Speed, Safety, and Dignity: Pediatric
Pharmaceutical Development in an Age of Optimism, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1 (2002);
Rupali Gandhi, Research Involving Children: Regulations, Review Boards and Reform, 8 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 264 (2005); Anna Gercas, The Universal Declaration on Bioethics
and Human Rights: Promoting International Discussion on the Morality of Non-Therapeutic
Research on Children, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 629 (2006); Clifton R. Gray, The "Greater Good"
... At What Cost?. How Non-therapeutic Scientific Studies Can Now Create Viable Negligence
Claims in Maryland After Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc., 32 U. BALT. L. REv. 73,
87-92 (2002); William G. Kelly, Ericka and Myron: Canaries in the Mines, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 173 (2002); Loretta M. Kopelman, Children as Research Subjects: Moral Disputes,
Regulatory Guidance, and Recent Court Decisions, 73 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 596 (2006);
Loretta M. Kopelman, Minimal Risk as an International Ethical Standard in Research, 29 J.
MED. & PHIL. 351 (2004); Loretta M. Kopelman, Pediatric Research Regulations Under Legal
Scrutiny: Grimes Narrows Their Interpretation, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 38 (2002); Symposium,
Research with Children: The New Legal and Policy Landscape, 6 J. HEALTH CAREL. & POL'Y 1
(2002); Jennifer Rosato, The Ethics of Clinical Trials: A Child's View, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
362 (2000); Lainie Friedman Ross, In Defense of the Hopkins LeadAbatement Studies, 30 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 50 (2002); Efi Rubinstein, Going Beyond Parents and Institutional Review
Boards in Protecting Children Involved in Nontherapeutic Research, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 251 (2003); David M. Smolin, Nontherapeutic Research with Children: The Virtues and
Vices of Legal Uncertainty, 33 CUMB. L. REV. 621 (2002); William J. Wenner, Does the Legal
System Provide Adequate Protection for Children in Scientific Experiments? The Unanswered
Question of Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 243 (2004).
167. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN & SHEILA M. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBOROOK WARS 263 (1984).
168. NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1978), available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/
guidelines/belmont.html; see also In re Brandt (The Medical Trial), 14 Ann. Dig. 296, 297-98
(Nuremburg, Germany, U.S. Military Trib. 1947); World Med. Ass'n [WMA], Declaration of
Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (June 1964)
(amended 2000), available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/index.html;
2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 181-84 (1949), available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/
nuremberg.html.
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Belmont Report requires special protections for children in human-subject research
because they are particularly vulnerable to exploitation.1
69
The nonsubordination principle also explains the willingness of courts to review
parental decisions to use one child's body to save the life of another child. Although
most such cases are decided without court involvement under the current paradigm of
parental choice, there are exceptions. In such cases, courts become involved, despite
the impact on parental choice, because the particular parental choice may well sacrifice
the donor child's body to serve the interests of the parents and recipient child without
corresponding benefit to the donor child. The courts confronting these cases have
uniformly held that that they will abide by the parents' choice only if the decision will,
in fact, serve the donor child's best interests by preserving a close relationship with the
recipient sibling.' 70 In other words, courts will not countenance subjugation of the
donor child's body for someone else's purposes.
Thus, parental rights are not so broad as to allow parents to subordinate a child's
life or body for their own purposes. Understanding precisely how the nonsubordination
principle applies within the parent-child relationship requires a clear understanding of
the moral status and corresponding rights of children because it is the children's status
and rights that define the limitations of parental self-determination. I am not prepared
to offer a fully articulated theory of children's moral status and rights. But the law is
clear on some points: neither a child's body nor certain choices are the province of
parents. Children have strong interests in bodily integrity, safety, and freedom from
bodily restraint, 7'' as well as "a substantial liberty interest in not being confined
unnecessarily for medical treatment."'' 72 Parents have no right to interfere with these
interests for their own benefit. Children also have exclusive rights to make certain
fundamental decisions for themselves, and parents cannot make choices that will
deprive the child of the opportunity to make those choices as an adult. Thus, it is clear
that nothing about being a parent gives a person the right to violate a child's body, and
nothing about the fact of medical involvement changes the child's right to human
respect.
C. Medical and Surgical Shaping of Children is Different
Parents make all kinds of decisions that shape their children. By exposing a child to
music or art, parents help shape the child's cultural preferences. By reading to a young
child or choosing special schools, parents help shape a child's intellectual
development. By feeding a child a steady diet of fast-food dinners or implementing a
169. See Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principlesfor Medical Research Involving Human
Subjects, supra note 168.
170. Michele Goodwin synthesizes these decisions in M* Sister's Keeper?: Law, Children,
and Compelled Donation, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 357, 386-402 (2007); see also Coleman,
supra note 122.
171. Cf Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) (recognizing rights as belonging to
all persons regardless of capacity).
172. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979); cf Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
221-22 (1990) (recognizing a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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regular exercise program, parents help shape a child's body. These examples of
parental shaping are not legally or morally problematic. In each, the parent is fulfilling
a duty to care for a child. To be sure, parents use discretion in deciding how to meet
the child's needs, but their authority to act is derived from their obligation to meet the
child's basic needs. 173 In fulfilling their parental obligations, the exercise of discretion
is entitled to presumptive deference as a matter of family privacy.
174
Medical treatment decisions also shape children. Surgically implanting a pin and
casting a broken leg, for example, shapes a child's body; administering Dilantin to a
child with a seizure disorder shapes a child's brain.175 The power to make medical
decisions for a child gives parents the kind of access to a child's body that they have in
no other context. Yet parents "can and must" make decisions for a child when a child is
sick or her body is not functioning properly.176 Like other parental powers, the power
to make medical decisions derives from parental obligations to meet the needs of the
child. 177 The parent who consents to surgery for a broken leg or for the administration
of seizure medicine is not subordinating the child's life or body for his or her own
purposes. Rather, the parent's decision advances the child's long-term interest in
bodily integrity even if that decision compromises the child's immediate interest in
bodily integrity and freedom from confinement. Of course, parents sometimes make
medical-treatment decisions that subordinate a child's life or health to other parental
interests, such as religiously motivated refusals of lifesaving blood transfusions. Courts
will override those decisions when the decision would result in a violation of the
nonsubordination principle.17
8
Parents also make decisions to use medicine for reasons other than treatment of a
medical or functional need of a child. In such cases, the danger that a parent is
173. That parents have legal and moral obligations to meet the basic needs of children is
beyond dispute. Parents have a "high duty[] to recognize and prepare [their children] for
additional obligations." Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). They have a
specific 'high duty' to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and follow medical advice."
Parham, 442 U.S. at 602.
174. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mentry, 190 Cal. Rptr. 843, 847-48 (App. 1983) (applying
the notion of family privacy); Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1062 (Mass. 1978)
(recognizing "an entire 'private realm of family life which must be afforded protection from
unwarranted State interference."' (quoting Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,255-56 (1978))).
175. See PFIZER, INFATABS (2009), available at http://www.pfizer.com/files/products/
uspi-dilantin infatabs.pdf.
176. Parham, 442 U.S. at 603.
177. Custody ofa Minor, 379 N.E.2d at 1063.
[Tihe parental right to control a child's nurture is grounded not in any
"absolute property right" which can be enforced to the detriment of the
child, but rather is akin to a trust, "subject to... [a] correlative duty to care
for and protect the child, and... [terminable] by [the parents'] failure to
discharge their obligations."
Id. (quoting Richards v. Forrest, 180 N.E. 508, 511 (Mass. 1932)) (all alterations except the first
in original).
178. See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d at 1053 (ordering a child to undergo
chemotherapy); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp. Unit No. 1 (Harborview), 390 U.S.
598 (1968) (per curium), aff'g 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (overriding parental refusal
to provide blood transfusions).
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sacrificing a child's body for reasons unrelated to the child's welfare is acute. When
parents elect to modify a child's body with medically unnecessary surgery or medical
treatments, they turn a healthy child into a patient and compromise a child's interests in
bodily integrity, safety, and freedom from confinement.179 Such invasions of the child's
liberty are justified only if necessary to meet the child's needs. Medically unnecessary
interventions might meet the needs of a child, but they might not. They might instead
be a matter of parental preference. A parent might choose to renovate a child's body
for the same reasons he would paint a car or renovate a functioning kitchen. The
resulting product will be more aesthetically pleasing, a source of pride, and easier to
operate. This process of manufacture may have been at play in each focus case. Despite
his claims that it was for her own good, for example, it is quite possible that the
adoptive father modified his daughter because he preferred the look of round-eyed
girls; that the father injected HGH into his son's body to claim rights to a basketball-
playing son; that Brooke Bates's parents had her fat removed because they did not
want to see it or it brought them shame; and that Ashley's parents stunted her growth
and removed her organs to improve their own lives by creating a child who was, in
effect, easier to operate than the one to which they gave birth. To be sure, it is also
possible, especially in Ashley's case, that the parents were motivated solely by a desire
to do what they deemed best for their child.18 0 Indeed, I would be surprised if the
parents' motives in the cases were black or white. My point is simply that the
possibility of self-dealing is present in each of these cases.
Self-dealing from a child's body is not acceptable. Although children maybe part of
a family unit in which they have little control, their bodies are not community property.
Their right to bodily integrity is personal. Indeed, it is not clear that parents have any
right to invade a child's body except to meet a child's demonstrated need. Children are
not cars. They are not kitchens. They are not a parental possession to be crafted.
Children are persons who should not be treated as objects of design or instruments of
ambition. Objectifying children denies their personhood and subordinates their present
and future interests. Parental overreaching is especially troubling in the health-care
context because the impact on the child's bodily integrity is immediate and irrevocable.
Philosopher Michael Sandel explains the problem from a similar perspective. He
argues that when parenting takes on the role of manufacture "[t]he problem lies in the
hubris of the designing parents .... Even if this disposition did not make parents
tyrants to their children, it would disfigure the relation between parent and child...
, Sandel reflects on the teaching of theologian William May that parenthood, more
than any other human relationship, teaches an "openness to the unbidden."',82 May's
construct, says Sandel, "appreciates children as gifts as they come, not as objects of our
design or products of our will or instruments of our ambition."' 83 It recognizes that
"[p]arental love is not contingent on the talents and attributes a child happens to
179. Parham, 442 U.S. at 600; see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990).
180. Even Brooke Bates's parents might have been trying to help her avoid social stigma.
181. Michael J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection: What's Wrong with Designer
Children, Bionic Athletes, and Genetic Engineering, in BONNIE STEINBOCK, ALEX JOHN LONDON,
& JOHN ARRAs, ETfucAL IssuEs IN MODERN MEDICINE: CONTEMIORARY READINGS IN BIOETHIcs
890, 894 (7th ed. 2009).
182. Id.
183. Id.
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have,"'l but on acceptance of the person the child is. Accepting the child as a gift, he
says, does not "mean that parents must shrink from shaping and directing the
development of their child" or "be passive in the face of illness or disease."'18 5 To the
contrary, Sandel says parents have an "obligation to cultivate their children,"' 186 which
includes healing and preventing sickness and injury. "Healing sickness or injury does
not override a child's natural capacities but permits them to flourish."'
187
Sandel, then, would differentiate the parent's role in treating a broken leg from the
father's role in the eye shaping focus case by what the parental choices say about the
relationship between parent and child. The parent who consents to surgery and casting
on the broken leg is not rejecting the child as she came or overriding the child's natural
capacities. Instead, that parent is fulfilling an obligation to cultivate the child and to
allow her to flourish. By contrast, the adoptive father who consented to surgery to
modify the shape of his Asian daughter's eyes has failed to appreciate the child as a gift
and rejected the child's natural capacity as a complete person. He changed her into a
child with round eyes that better matched his Caucasian family. In so doing, he has
denied her a physical marker of ethnicity that some people value as a critical
component of identity. 188 He has turned her from a fully formed and healthy child into
a patient, a person in need of treatment. His decision imposed his will on her in an
exercise of hyperagency and hubris that distorted the parent-child relationship.
The fact that the father in the eye surgery focus case was a new adoptive parent
makes Sandel's gift analogy particularly apt, and makes the father's determination to
modify his daughter's ethnic features feel particularly egregious. Perhaps because
adoption already involves an exchange, the transfer of custody of a fully formed human
being, an adoptive parent's moral obligation to respect the child's individuality is
especially clear, especially in a cross-cultural or cross-racial adoption. But the fact of
adoption changes nothing about the moral or legal status of the child. Every child
deserves respect for his or her individual personhood separate from the interests of the
parent. The nonsubordination principle helps ensure that this respect is afforded.
Application of the nonsubordination principle to define the limits of parental rights
in the context of medical decision making in specific cases is complicated by the fact
that parents have both a right and a "high duty to recognize symptoms of illness and to
seek and follow medical advice."' 189 Unlike with adult relationships, the line that
defines as unacceptable unilateral decisions by one person that interfere with bodily
integrity of another person is not at all clear in the parent-child relationship. For
example, a parental decision to consent to surgery to insert a pin into a child's broken
leg has an immediate impact on the child's bodily integrity and liberty interests, but the
decision is surely a parent's to make. By contrast, a decision to cut the genitals of a
female child to conform to cultural traditions of the parents is not. Distinguishing
parental decisions designed to meet a child's needs from those that subordinate the
child's interests for the sake of the parent is no easy task.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Kobrin, supra note 1.
189. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
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Sandel relies on an apparent, but not express, distinction in the law between parental
power to use medical interventions to restore and protect health and function and
parental power to intervene for nontherapeutic purposes. In Parham, for example, the
Court expressly held that "it is necessary that the [third-party] decisionmaker have the
authority to refuse to admit any child who does not satisfy the medical standards for
admission." 190 In other words, at least in the context of mental health commitments, the
Court limited the parents' power to make health-care decisions for the child to
decisions that are medically necessary or otherwise therapeutic. Similarly, in the
research context, state and federal laws limit parental authority to enroll children in
nontherapeutic research protocols. 19' Limitations on parental authority to consent to
nontherapeutic treatment on their children make sense if the parent's right to control a
child's health care is understood as rooted in the parental obligation to meet the child's
needs, not in an ownership right over a child's body. But even some nontherapeutic
interventions-vaccines or cutting tendons in a child with severe contractures, for
example-may meet a child's needs. Thus, to some extent at least, application of the
nonsubordination principle to medical decision making for children depends in part on
parental motive, and that too is case dependent. A decision to use HGH or to attenuate
the growth of child like Ashley, for example, may or may not be a matter of parental
preference rather than care for the child. For these reasons, recognition and application
of the nonsubordination principle is unlikely to yield bright-line rules for medical
decision-making cases.
Nonetheless, it is my position that the nonsubordination principle should be
embedded in legal models for evaluating the scope of parental power. The current
decision-making paradigm for medical decision making for children fails to recognize
the possibility and importance of the subordination inherent in shaping cases. Instead,
it structures the parent-child relationship as a hierarchical one in which a parent has a
broad right to use medicine or surgery to physically invade a child's body except in
exceptional cases involving grievous harm, death, or obvious conflicts of interest. In
this way, the hierarchical model of family allows a parent to impose his will on a child
without regard for the child's welfare or the child's right to make autonomous
decisions as an adult. The hierarchal model should be replaced with a more nuanced
model that better respects the child as a vulnerable but complete person.
IV. CONCERNING THE CHILD: ANOTHER VIEW OF PARENTHOOD
Thus far, I have argued that although parents have constitutionally protected
authority to make most medical decisions for their children, they have no right to use
medicine or surgery to shape their children's bodies. The traditional hierarchical model
of the family at play in the health-care setting, which starts from an assumption of
190. Id. at 607.
191. 45 C.F.R. § 46.404-07 (2009) (restricting the use of healthy children in research to
studies that involve no more than "minimal risk"); see also Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst.,
Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 843--44 (Md. 2001) (declaring invalid parental consent given to the use of
children in nontherapeutic research protocols involving more than minimal risk); T.D. v. N.Y.
State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y.App. Div. 1996) (invalidating state
regulations that allowed more than minimal risk on children).
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parental power, does not support such a distinction.1 92 The law is not wed to the
hierarchical model, however.
93
In fact, there is a clear trend outside medicine toward increasing respect for
children's rights and dignity that is incompatible with the understanding of children
inherent in the hierarchical model of family. 194 Children's rights were strengthened in
1969 when the Supreme Court determined that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause applied to children; that children are "'persons' under our
Constitution;"195 and that children have rights to freedom of expression. 196 By 1979, in
abortion and contraception cases, the Supreme Court recognized that minors have a
right to privacy, which is at least as important as parental rights. 197 Thus, the law
recognizes that children are rights-possessing persons, not property or extensions of
their parents.
But what it means for children to be individual persons with rights is far from clear
because these rights-bearing people are needy and vulnerable, and their familial
relationships directly affect their welfare.198 Moreover, these rights-bearing but
192. The hierarchical model allows for state intervention only in cases in which the parental
choice will cause the child grievous harm or death. See Ann MacLean Massie, The Religion
Clauses and Parental Health Care Decisionmaking for Children: Suggestions for a New
Approach, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 725, 774 (1994) (explaining that parents have both "the
freedom and the responsibility to make health-care decisions for [young children]"). And while
the parents' perspectives and values, including their religious beliefs, will play a part in the
choices they make, the State "has defined the parameters of parental freedom: failure to provide
adequate medical care amounts to child abuse or neglect and entitles the state to step in and take
over the supervision of a child's medical treatment or to punish parents whose violation of their
statutory duty has resulted in harm to a child." Id. For reasons I've explained, it is unlikely that
any court would deem being a few inches taller, having a little less fat, having rounded eyes, or
even being smaller and more transportable, to be grievous harms constituting medical abuse.
193. Martha Minow identifies "five legal frameworks for thinking about children" that affect
the legal construction of family: "child protection, child liberation, children as potential adults,
children in need of traditional authority, and social resource redistribution." Martha Minow,
What Ever Happened to Children's Rights, 80 MniN. L. REv. 267, 268 (1995) (advocating for
international human rights for children as a means of respecting children as human beings
without displacing or undermining parents).
194. See id.; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Out of Children's Needs, Children's Rights":
The Child's Voice in Defining the Family, 8 BYU J. PuB. L. 321 (1993). The notion that
children are persons not property is firmly rooted in modem family law. See, e.g., Coleman,
supra note 122, at 526-27, 614-16.
195. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
196. See id. ("Students in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our
Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect,just as they
themselves must respect their obligations to the State.").
197. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,655-56 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring) (comparing
a minor's privacy interest in obtaining an abortion with the judicial exception to parental
consent requirements); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976)
("Any independent interest the parent may have in the termination of the minor daughter's
pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the competent minor mature enough
to have become pregnant.").
198. See John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REv.
421,480-82 (1996).
[Vol. 85:955
2010] SHAPING PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER CHILDRENS'BODIES 987
vulnerable persons are part of a familial unit, which is itself afforded constitutional
protections. As a result, the legal role of parents in relation to their children varies by
context and is at times conflicting and paradoxical. John Robertson explains:
Children spring from their parents' loins and are dependent on them for many
years, yet they are separate persons with interests and rights that on occasion
conflict with the interests of parents. Parents control whether they come into
existence, but cannot control their existence once they are here.
... The parental bundle of rights over children includes great latitude over where
children will live, be educated, and the values they will be taught.
At the same time, the child's separate personhood strictly limits this bundle of
rights. Parents have rearing rights in children, but they also have duties to provide
children with food, shelter, and medical care, and to protect their welfare. They
may choose their education within parameters set by the state, but they cannot
deny them education altogether. If they neglect those duties or physically abuse
children, they lose their rights to rear.199
Whatever the nature of children's rights, young children cannot make their own health-
care decisions. Young children are especially vulnerable when they are sick or injured.
They need care, but they lack the capacity to chart their own course by making
reasoned judgments about complex science, individual values, and long-term
consequences. As children mature, they are increasingly able to participate in medical
decision making, but young children need their parents to make medical decisions for
them. Parents, more than anyone else, understand the child as an individual with
individual needs, pain tolerance, capacity for confinement, values, and fears. 0 As a
matter of good policy (and constitutional law), parents are presumed to "possess what a
child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making
life's difficult decisions.
201
A. Alternative Models
In efforts to reconcile the competing needs and rights of children, the rights of
parents, and interests of the state in protecting children, several prominent family law
and moral theorists have suggested models of the family that appear well suited to
medical decision making for children. These robust models respect the child as a
199. Id. (footnotes omitted).
200. See Jacqueline J. Glover, Should Families Make Health Care Decisions?, 53 MD. L.
REv. 1158, 1160-62 (1994) (addressing how families are suited to make medical decisions for
family members because of their capacity to serve as clinical helper, tape recorder, and assessor
of patient best interest and because of their status as intimates of the patient).
201. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). "The unique interdependence between the
child and the family justifies the family's participation in treatment related decisions. Within the
family unit, there is a strong presumption in favor of the parents as primary decision-makers for
their children." Erin A. Nealy, Medical Decision-Making for Children: A Struggle for
Autonomy, 49 SMUL. REV. 133, 153 (1995).
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vulnerable, yet complete individual within an autonomous family unit in ways that the
hierarchical model does not.
For example, Barbara Bennett Woodhouse proposed a "generist perspective [that]
views nurturing of the next generation as the touchstone of the family."20 2 The generist
perspective does not simply substitute children for adults as autonomous rights bearers
in an adversarial system. This perspective recognizes "that most children's law
involves adults acting on behalf of children" 20 3 and that "[c]hildren do not start out as
autonomous beings; they grow into autonomy.' '204 The Woodhouse model views an
adult's relationship with children as one more like a trustee to a beneficiary rather than
owner to chattel:
Adult "rights" of control and custody yield to the less adversarial notions of
obligation to provide nurturing, authority to act on the child's behalf, and standing
to participate in collaborative planning to meet the child's needs. A generist
perspective involves taming the expression of adult power known as "rights talk"
in order to redirect the discussion in terms of meeting children's needs.
20 5
Legal philosopher Joel Feinberg also incorporates a conception of parent as trustee
in his work defining a child's right to an open future.20 6 His model essentially envisions
parents as holders in trust of certain future interests that belong to the child. He
explains that rights ordinarily can be divided into four categories. First, there are rights
that adults and children have in common, 20 7 such as a right not to be killed. Second,
there are rights that are generally possessed only by children and "childlike" adults that
derive from the child's dependence on others for such basics as food, shelter, and
20protection. 08 Feinberg calls these "dependency rights," and they include the child's
right to be fed, nourished, and protected.2 09 Third, there are rights that can be exercised
only by adults, such as the free exercise of religion.2 10 Finally, Feinberg identifies a
202. Woodhouse, supra note 194, at 321.
203. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on
Parents'Rights, 14 CARDOzO L. REv. 1747, 1756 (1993).
204. Id.
205. Woodhouse, supra note 194, at 321; see also Woodhouse, supra note 203 (considering
parents not as holding rights in their children but as fiduciaries entrusted with their children's
care and empowered to care for them). "[P]olicy-makers and judges need to see children not as
abstract constructions of innocence detached from their surroundings, but as real people
embedded in families and communities. These children have their own deep attachments,
experiences, and individual needs that may not conform to the child saver's own values or
experience." Woodhouse, supra note 194, at 330.
206. Joel Feinberg, The Child's Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS, PARENTAL AuTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds.,
1980).
207. Id. at 125; cf Philip Fetzer & Laurence Houlgate, Are Juveniles Still "Persons" Under
the United States Constitution?: A New Theory of Children's Constitutional Rights, 5 INT'L J.
CHILD. RTs. 319, 335-36 (1997) (emphasizing the difference between having a right and
enjoying it).
208. Feinberg, supra note 206, at 125.
209. See id
210. Id,
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category of "rights-in-trust," rights that are to be "saved for the child until he is an
adult."
2 11
Rights-in-trust, Feinberg argues, include "anticipatory autonomy rights,' '212 which
will eventually belong to the child when she becomes a "fully formed self-determining
adult. ,1 3
An example is the right to choose one's spouse. Children and teenagers lack the
legal and social grounds on which to assert such a right, but clearly the child,
when he or she attains adulthood, will have that right. Therefore, the child now has
the right not to be irrevocably betrothed to someone.214
According to Feinberg, rights-in-trust can be violated before the child is in a
position to exercise them:
The violating conduct guarantees now that when the child is an autonomous adult,
certain key options will already be closed to him. His right while he is still a child
is to have these future options kept open until he is a fully formed self-determining
adult capable of deciding among them.
215
Houlgate continues on this point:
For example, an infant of two months has the right to walk freely down the public
sidewalk, even though she is not yet capable of enjoying this right. What then
could it mean to say that she has the right to freedom of movement? The answer is
that it is a right-in-trust. It is a right to be saved for the child until she gains the
ability to walk. One would violate this right now by cutting off her legs, making it
physically impossible for her to ever be capable of self-locomotion at some future
time.
2 1
6
Parents are morally obligated to protect a child's rights-in-trust now so that the child
can exercise them as an adult. When a parent seeks to violate a right held in trust,
Feinberg argues, the state should step in: "[c]hildren are not legally capable of
defending their own future interests against present infringement by their parents, so
that task must be performed for them."
217
211. Id. at 125-26. Laurence D. Houlgate makes a similar argument in Laurence D.
Houlgate, Three Concepts of Children's Constitutional Rights: Reflections in Moral Theory, 2
U. PA. J. CONST L. 77 (1999).
212. Feinberg, supra note 206, at 126; cf 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE
CIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 38 (1984) (explaining that a person has an interest in
something when he "stands to gain or lose" depending upon the outcome).
213. Feinberg, supra note 206, at 126.
214. Dena S. Davis, The Child's Right to an Open Future: Yoder andBeyond, 26 CAP. U. L.
REv. 93, 94 (1997) (emphasis in original).
215. Feinberg, supra note 206, at 126 (emphasis in original).
216. Houlgate, supra note 211, at 87.
217. Feinberg, supra note 206, at 128.
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Elizabeth Scott and Robert Scott take the conception of parent as fiduciary farther
and more literally than Woodhouse or Feinberg. 218 Scott and Scott propose a model of
the family "premised on a fiduciary framework [that] would entrust parents with the
duty to raise their children to adulthood, to provide for their physical and psychological
needs, and to perform the services of parenthood with reasonable diligence and
'undivided loyalty' toward their children's interests."219 Scott and Scott acknowledge
the difficulties of applying fiduciary law to the parent-child relationship, 220 but they
contend that defining parental power by the imposition of duties of care and loyalty
analogous to those of other fiduciaries will "encourage parents to approach the tasks of
child-rearing with an elevated sense of duty and [will] detect when parents fail to
perform those tasks adequately." 221 In addition, they argue the fiduciary model rewards
the fiduciary role. "The role of trustee, for example, invokes respect in the community,
signaling that the individual has assumed an important responsibility, and is
trustworthy and morally upright. Community recognition of these attributes carries its
own reward, enhancing the nonpecuniary value of the fiduciary role.,
222
Scott and Scott would apply a "parental judgment rule" to afford parent-fiduciaries
considerable deference and relax the blanket rule against self-dealing, which normally
applies to trustees.223 As a result, their relational model would limit
legally-imposed restrictions to only those that reflect a normative consensus about
the welfare of children, [leaving parents] with broad discretion to rear their
children according to their own values. Thus, a limited domain for legal regulation
218. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401
(1995).
219. Id. at2419.
220. Id. at 2430.
It is apparent at the outset, however, that applying a fiduciary framework to the
parent-child relationship requires accommodation of some peculiar features that
distinguish this relationship from many others in the fiduciary category. Given the
extensive scope of the relationship, a prescription that parents must systematically
subordinate their personal interest to that of the child when the two are in conflict
seems unduly burdensome, and ultimately likely to deter prospective parents from
taking on the role. Furthermore, enforcement of such an obligation, although
theoretically feasible, would require costly and intrusive state supervision of intact
families. This effect seems particularly troublesome given the intimacy of the
relationship and the presumed importance of privacy to optimal family
functioning. Moreover, the substantial costs to children of replacing parents and of
severing the filial bond inhibits the imposition of a sanction that is used to
discipline fiduciaries in other contexts.
Thus, a model scheme for regulating the parent-child relationship must attend
- to the unique features of this familial bond, and some adaptation of the
conventional regulatory mechanisms is required. The usefulness of this approach
is not diminished by these constraints, however, so long as policymakers
appreciate the goals of regulation and evaluate legal rules as means to the
prescribed ends.
Id. (footnote omitted).
221. Id. at2452.
222. Id. at 2429.
223. See id. at 2438.
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promotes the shared objective of encouraging investment in the parental role. At
the same time, the law reinforces broadly shared social norms in ways that induce
parents to internalize an obligation to attend to their children's welfare.
224
The models proposed by Woodhouse, Feinberg, and Scott and Scott differ in their
specifics, and those specifics are subject to criticisms beyond the scope of this
Article. 225 Nonetheless, the three models reflect various applications of a core set of
common values that frame an understanding of family that respects children as
vulnerable, yet independent, human beings.
B. Common Principles
The Woodhouse, Feinberg, and Scott and Scott models all have the normative goal
of promoting child welfare, not parental autonomy. They each position the parent as a
fiduciary holding a child's welfare in a kind of trust, not as an owner of the child's
person. This construct-parent as trustee-reflects an understanding that children are
not chattel. They are persons who hold rights but lack an immediate capacity to enjoy
or exercise some of those rights. The trustee construct also recognizes that children
have unique needs as developing persons and that those needs give rise to parental
responsibilities. Thus, according to Woodhouse, Feinberg, and Scott and Scott, parents
have the responsibility for meeting children's basic needs for food, education, health
care, culture, and nurture, and they must speak for their children when those children
are not able to speak for themselves. In meeting these obligations, parents must have
room to exercise discretion and make judgment calls. But because parental authority is
defined in terms of meeting children's needs, and because children have full moral
status as persons, it is not appropriate for parents to subordinate a child's life, liberty,
or property for their own purposes. Thus, parents must protect the child's developing
autonomy interests so that the child can exercise those interests as an adult. For that
reason, parental action should not foreclose the child's ability to make choices for
herself as an adult except when necessary to meet an immediate need of the child.
It is my position that the same principles should guide medical decision making for
children to ensure that children's needs are met with the dignity and respect due to all
persons. I propose, then, to consider application of a trust-based construct of family in
that context. The first task is to delineate a parent's specific rights and duties in a
framework positing the parent as trustee of the child's welfare and developing rights.
V. RECONSTRUCTING THE ROLE OF THE PARENT IN MEDICAL DECISION MAKING FOR
CHILDREN
This Part develops an explicit analogy between parents and trustees by considering
the application of the laws governing trustees and other fiduciaries in the family
context. The trust-based construct I propose borrows from Woodhouse the notion that
224. Id. at 2439.
225. For example, I've criticized Feinberg's fiamework for its portrayal of people with
disabilities as cheated of lives worth living. See Alicia R. Ouellette, Insult to Injury: A
Disability-Sensitive Response to Smolensky's Call for Parental Tort Liability for
Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 397, 402-03 (2008).
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parents are best regarded as trustees or stewards of their child's welfare; 226 from
Feinberg the notion that what parents hold in trust is not the child him- or herself, but
the child's welfare and developing rights; 227 and from Scott and Scott the notion that
parents owe their children specific fiduciary-type responsibilities. 228 The goal is to use
an understanding of the trust relationship to define the scope of parental power in
medical decision making for children.
Before setting forth the specifics of the synthesized model I wish to explore, I
should explain why I am not advocating wholesale application of the Woodhouse,
Feinberg, or Scott and Scott models. The short answer is that they are not detailed
enough to address the very narrow and complex problem of defining the limits of
parental power in medical decision making for children, which is, of course, necessary
to achieve this Article's goal. Trustee analogies, such as those drawn by Woodhouse
and Feinberg, are typically "only casually drawn, without any systematic attention to
the implications of treating parents as fiduciaries." 229 Like Scott and Scott, I wish to
"push the analogy beyond rhetoric, 230 and use the trustee analogy to define roles in a
complex part of a complex relationship. The Scott and Scott model is more helpful
than Woodhouse's or Feinberg's in its development both of fiduciary duties
appropriate to the family context and of a corollary to the business-judgment rule,
which they call the "parental judgment rule.",23' But their model is so broad and
sweeping-Scott and Scott would regulate all aspects of the parent-child relationship
with monitoring, bonding, and sanctioning devices232 -its usefulness for resolving any
particular dilemma is limited.233 As Scott and Scott acknowledge, application of
conflict-of-interest and duty-of-loyalty rules varies depending on the nature of the
fiduciary relationship, which in the family context may be that of agent, corporate
director, guardian, or trustee depending on context.234 "Predicting the precise domain
of these rules ex ante is a problematic exercise, 235 and Scott and Scott offer little
guidance about how to resolve the issue. In this respect, Woodhouse and Feinberg are
more helpful. Both make strong arguments about the source of parental power and
children's vulnerability, which help define the terms of the "trust" at play in the health-
care domain.
226. See Woodhouse, supra note 194, at 321.
227. See Feinberg, supra note 206, at 125-26.
228. See Scott & Scott, supra note 218.
229. Id. at 2419. Feinberg's rhetoric is especially casual because his goal is to define
children's rights, not the relational interest of parents and children.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 2438. The parental judgment rule establishes a presumption of reasonable
diligence and good faith in the exercise of parental duties. Id. at 2437-38.
232. Their framework would regulate everything from the formation of families to the
termination of parental rights. They apply their framework to regulate intact families and what
they call "broken families." See id. at 2442-43; see also id. at 2457-60 (discussing the
regulation of unmarried fathers' claims).
233. 1 am also not persuaded by their application of their model to argue for stringent
regulation of what they term "broken families." See id. at 2442.
234. Their model would impose relaxed rules against self-dealing in some cases but not in
others. See id. at 2438.
235. Id.
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I should also explain why I develop a trust-based model for medical decision
making, instead of working with another fiduciary relationship, such as a guardianship
or conservatorship. First, a trust is the most flexible fiduciary relationship. It affords
trustees wide discretion without imposing categorical rules. Also, the trust's terms can
be defined to change over time to best serve the beneficiary's needs. Such flexibility is
necessary to accommodate children's developing ability to participate in their own
decision making. Although this Article does not explore how a trust-based construct
would apply to a mature minor-the Article's goal is to introduce the model, not flesh
out every aspect of its application-one could easily develop the trust-based model to
give children increasing rights as they mature. Second, in a trust relationship, the duty
of loyalty is strictly enforced to prohibit self-dealing and conflicts of interest. In some
parenting contexts, it would be inappropriate to prevent a parent from making
decisions for a child that are for her own or a sibling's benefit. For example, it would
be unrealistic to say that a parent could not choose a school based on proximity to her
work or the presence of a special program for a sibling. With respect to medical
interventions, however, I think it appropriate to require a parent to make decisions
solely in the child's interest in light of the decision's immediate impact on the child's
bodily integrity.
Thus, I follow Scott and Scott's lead in looking to the law governing trustees and
other fiduciaries as a tool for understanding the parents' role with respect to their
child's welfare and developing rights. I am not arguing that the trust law should be
directly incorporated into health law, however. Trust law relies on significant court
oversight, which is not appropriate in medical or family decision making.236 Moreover,
deeming parents to be trustees in a technical sense is incompatible with the vast scope
ofparental obligations237 and the nebulous nature of the "property" held by parents for
children.238 Of course, I also recognize the irony of using property law to prevent
children from being treated like chattel. The trust relationship is, nonetheless, a
relationship between two people, and consideration of the well-studied power
dynamics between trustees and trust beneficiaries provides a robust framework for
defining the power dynamics between parents and their children in the medical context.
236. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 (1979). The Court found that "[t]he mode and
procedure of medical diagnostic procedures is not the business of judges. What is best for a
child is an individual medical decision that must be left to the judgment of the physician in each
case." Id. at 608. The Court also rejected the "notion that shortcomings of specialists can always
be avoided by shifting the decision from a trained specialist using the traditional tools of
medical science to an untrained judge or administrative hearing office after a judicial-type
hearing." Id. at 609; see also id. at 607 (stating that in addition to either a law-trained judicial or
administrative officer, a staff physician would suffice so long as they are free to evaluate the
child's well-being and need for treatment).
237. "Given the extensive scope of the relationship, a prescription that parents must
systematically subordinate their personal interest to that of the child when the two are in conflict
seems unduly burdensome." Scott & Scott, supra note 218, at 2430.
238. A trust is recognized at law only when there is a clearly defined trust property. See
RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2001). It would be impossible to define a child's welfare
and developing fights as a property.
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A. Powers and Responsibilities of Trustees Generally
A trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property that subjects the person
who holds legal title to the property, the trustee, to duties to manage the trust property
for the benefit of another person or persons, the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the
trust. A trustee occupies a position of particular responsibility with a primary duty to
administer the trust solely in the interest or for the benefit of the beneficiary.23 9 The
beneficiary's interest in the trust property may be present, future, or contingent, but a
valid trust requires a clearly defined trust property.24 °
All trustees have "comprehensive powers.. . to manage the trust property and to
carry out the terms and purposes of the trust, ' 241 but those powers "must be exercised,
or not exercised, in accordance with the trustee's fiduciary obligations. ' '242 A trustee
has the broad discretionary powers to make ordinary decisions in managing, protecting,
and improving the property held in trust,2 43 but the trustee cannot exercise that power
in a manner prohibited by the terms of the trust. In managing real property held in trust,
for example, the trustee can properly incur expenses to keep, maintain, and even
improve the trust property "if, and as the property's retention and improvement are
prudent and suitable to the purposes of the trust," 244 but "[w]here the terms of a trust
direct retention of certain property or forbid the making of improvements or certain
types of repairs," the trustee lacks authority to make such improvements absent
permission of the court.
245
With respect to acts within the discretion of the trustee, "judicial intervention is not
warranted merely because the court would have differently exercised the discretion."
246
"When a trustee has discretion with respect to exercise of a power, its exercise is
subject to supervision by a court only to prevent abuse of discretion."247 A trustee may
abuse discretionary power by acting in bad faith or in a manner otherwise inconsistent
with the trustee's fiduciary duties; by misinterpreting the terms of the trust; or by acting
"beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment., 248
All the trustee's powers are subject to fundamental duties of prudence, loyalty, and
impartiality. 249 The trustee's primary duty is one of loyalty to the beneficiary, which
requires the trustee to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.250
The trustee violates his duty of loyalty when he uses the trust property for his own or a
third party's purposes. Accordingly, the trustee must not engage in transactions that
239. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 77-79 (2007).
240. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 103(3)(A), 103(12), 401 (2005).
241. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTs § 70(a) (2007).
242. Id. cmt. a.
243. Id. § 76 ("The trustee has a duty to administer the trust, diligently and in good faith, in
accordance with the terms of the trust and applicable law.").
244. Id. § 88 cmt. b.
245. Id.
246. Id. § 87 cmt. b.
247. Id. § 87.
248. Id. cmt. d.
249. Id. §§ 77-79.
250. Id. § 78.
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involve the trust property or create a conflict between his duty to the beneficiary and
his personal interests.25' Self-dealing occurs
when the trustee personally has a financial interest in the transaction of such a
nature that it might affect the trustee's judgment. Illustrative would be a sale to or
purchase from a firm of which the trustee is a member or a corporation in which
the trustee has a controlling or substantial interest.
252
In exceptional circumstances, a court may approve a transaction that would be
prohibited as self-dealing or as involving a conflict of interest if the court determines
that "[the transaction] is in the interest of the beneficiaries,"253 but the general rule
against self-dealing is normally strictly enforced. In some cases, appointment of a
trustee ad litem is appropriate for resolving issues about which the trustee may have a
conflict.
254
The trustee's "duty of prudence requires the exercise of reasonable care, skill, and
caution" in the administration of the trust.
255
The duty to act with caution does not, of course, mean the avoidance of all risk,
but refers to a degree of caution that is reasonably appropriate or suitable to the
particular trust, its purposes and circumstances, the beneficiaries' interests, and the
trustee's plan for administering the trust and achieving its objectives. 256
When investing assets of the trust, the duty of prudence requires the trustee to act "in
the context of the trust portfolio and as a part of an overall investment strategy, which
should incorporate risk and return objectives reasonably suitable to the trust. 257
A trustee commits a breach of trust by violating a duty as a result of negligence,
misconduct, or "mistake concerning the nature or extent of the trustee's powers and
duties under the terms of the trust or applicable law., 258 For this reason, when there is
reasonable doubt about the scope of a trustee's powers, a trustee or beneficiary may
251. Id.; id. cmt. d.
252. Id. cmt. d.
253. Id. cmt. c(1). The Restatement offers the following illustration:
S devised her estate to her brother B and T Co., as cotrustees, for the benefit of her
three minor children. B and T Co. have petitioned the appropriate court for
authority to sell certain property of the trust to B for a particular price. The court
approved the proposed sale to B based on its finding (i) that the evidence,
including testimony by T Co. and others, showed that the trustees' decision to sell
the property was sound for reasons of diversification and overall investment
strategy, and (ii) that, after qualified appraisals and prudent efforts over a
reasonable period of time, the trustees justifiably concluded that it was not
reasonably foreseeable that another buyer could be found who would match B's
offer. On this basis, the trustees may proceed with the proposed sale to B.
Id. cmt.c(1) illus. 1.
254. Id. cmt. c(1).
255. Id. § 77(2).
256. Id. cmt. b.
257. Id. § 90(a).
258. Id. § 71 cmt. a.
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apply to an appropriate court for instructions regarding the trust's administration or
distribution.259 Resort to the courts is not always appropriate, however. "If a matter
rests within the sound discretion of the trustee, or is a matter of business judgment, the
court ordinarily will not instruct the trustee how to exercise that discretion or
judgment., 260 Thus, a trustee's power to exercise his discretion over the trusteeship is
afforded presumptive deference and remains beyond review except to the extent that its
exercise is inconsistent with his duties to the beneficiary or deemed an abuse of
discretion. Those trustee decisions that may constitute an abuse of trust-such as those
that suggest self-dealing or involve a conflict of interest-should not be implemented
unless reviewed and deemed appropriate by the court or a trustee ad litem.
B. Powers and Responsibilities of Parents Concerning Children's Health
In a trust-based construction of the parent-child relationship, a parent's powers and
responsibilities should roughly parallel those of other trustees as outlined above. This
Part begins the task of sorting out parental rights and responsibilities in tandem with
trust law in an effort to clarify what positioning the parent as a trustee means in the
context of health-care decision making for children. This discussion does not purport,
or even attempt, to resolve every medical case involving children. Nor does it advocate
literal application of trust law to the parent-child context. Rather, it uses trust law as a
tool for identifying those parental decisions to which health-care providers need not, or
should not, acquiesce.
The first task in extending the parent-as-trustee analogy is to clarify what constitutes
the trust "property" held by the parent-trustee and the terms of the trust under which
parents operate. In explaining what it means for a parent to serve as trustee of the
child's welfare, Woodhouse defines parental power in terms of the child's needs
because parental authority is justified not by some ownership right, but by the
"limitations childhood imposes on personhood. ' '261 Because of his uniquely vulnerable
state the child needs nurturing, safety, health, food, education, culture, and shelter from
his parent. Feinberg calls these the child's dependency rights.262 These basic needs
comprise the child's welfare, which is among the "property" held in trust. Also among
the property held in trust are the child's developing autonomy rights--such as the right
to self-determination, privacy, and reproductive choice-which are the child's to
exercise once she becomes an adult. Feinberg calls these the child's "anticipatory
autonomy rights" or "rights in trust. ' 263 The child's developing rights are personal to
the child; the parent-trustee must preserve them for the child to exercise as an adult.
Thus, the trust implicit in Woodhouse's and Feinberg's models provides parents
express power to protect, nourish, and preserve the child's welfare, but denies them
authority to limit a child's future ability to make her own autonomous choices as an
adult unless the limitation on the child's developing rights to autonomy is necessary to
259. Id. § 71.
260. Id. cmt. d.
261. Dolgin, supra note 90, at 392 (explaining that the Supreme Court in Parham "justified
the scope of parental authority through reference to the limitations childhood imposes on
personhood"); see also Woodhouse, supra note 194, at 321.
262. See Feinberg, supra note 206, at 125.
263. Id. at 125-26.
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preserve the child's welfare now. In other words, the trust limits the parent's power to
foreclose opportunities and choices for the child by imposing an express duty on
parents to preserve for the child the ability to make his or her own choices in the future.
As trustees, parents would have comprehensive powers to manage the trust
property. As such, they could make ordinary decisions to protect and preserve the
child's health, which is a component of the child's welfare. In fact, most decisions to
protect and preserve a child's health would fall to the sound discretion of the parent
trustee and be entitled presumptive deference. Where, for example, a specific physical
or psychological need in a child triggers the need for a decision to prevent
deterioration of the trust asset (the child's health or a function necessary to becoming
an autonomous adult), the parent-trustee's decision about how to preserve and protect
the child's welfare would be the parent's prerogative so long as it does not violate a
fiduciary duty owed the child or otherwise constitute an abuse of discretion. The
parent-trustee's discretionary powers would also include the power to "improve" the
child's health through the administration of vaccines, despite the cost injections incur
to the child's body, because "retention and improvement [of the child's health, a
component of the trust property,] are prudent and suitable to the purposes of the
trust."
264
On the other hand, the terms of the trust and the duty of prudence would limit
parental power to make major "improvements" to the child's health.2 65 The trust
requires parents to preserve for the child the future ability to make his or her own
autonomous choices about use and treatment of his or her body. Thus, improving the
child at the expense of the child's ability to make future choices or exercise liberty
interests as an adult would likely be prohibited absent court permission.2 66 The exact
scope of this limitation is subject to debate and would need further development if a
trustee-based model were implemented. But I would suggest that a parental decision to
elect a preventive mastectomy or hysterectomy for a child carrying genes predictive of
breast or uterine cancer would be considered an "improvement" beyond the parent-
trustee's ordinary power in most cases. Such an improvement would prevent the child
from exercising choices about reproduction and bodily integrity as an adult, and, as
such, would likely fall outside the parent-trustee's discretionary authority absent an
immediate health crisis. It should be noted, however, that parents of children with
severe developmental disabilities who will never be able to make decisions for
themselves might well have the power to elect a preventive mastectomy or
hysterectomy for a child with disease-predicting genes. In such cases, "anticipatory
autonomy rights" are not part of the "property" of the trust. For that reason, the trustee
need not preserve decisions for the child to make in the future but could act now to
make discretionary decisions to preserve the child's health.
Fundamental duties of prudence, loyalty, and impartiality would also limit the
power of the parent-trustee.267 In managing the child's welfare and protecting her
developing autonomy rights, the parent-trustee's primary duty would be one of loyalty
to the child. 268 The parent-trustee would violate her duty by trading on the trust
264. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTs § 88 cmt. b.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See id. §§ 77-79.
268. See id. § 78.
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property-the child's welfare and ability to make her own choices in the future-for
her own purposes. Accordingly, the parent would lack the power to make transactions
compromising a child's health, bodily integrity, or future autonomy to satisfy the
parent-trustee's own aesthetic, cultural, or social preferences. 269 In exceptional
circumstances, a court (or other third party) could approve a transaction that would be
otherwise prohibited as self-dealing or involving a conflict of interest, but only after
the reviewing body determined that the transaction is in the child's interest. For
example, a parent-trustee would not have discretionary authority to use one child as an
organ or tissue donor for another. In such a case, the parent would have a clear conflict
of interest. But a court (or other third party) could determine that serving as a donor for
a sibling would in fact serve the donor child's interests and therefore approve the
transaction.
The duty of prudence would require the parent to exercise reasonable skill, care,
and caution in managing the child's welfare.270 The parent could make some decisions
that put the child's health at risk, but would be expected to exercise a "degree of
caution that is reasonably appropriate or suitable"2 71 to preserving, protecting, and
enhancing the child's welfare and future interests. When investing trust assets, that is,
when risking the child's health or safety or limiting the child's ability to make future
choices, the duty of prudence would require that parent-trustees act "in the context of
the trust portfolio and as a part of an overall investment strategy, which should
incorporate risk and return objectives reasonably suitable to the trust." 272 In other
words, a parent-trustee's decisions to risk a child's health or safety would be measured
in terms of its overall benefit to the child's welfare and the maintenance of future
options.
If treated as a formal trustee, a parent could turn to a court (or other third party)
when in doubt about the scope of his or her powers, but reviewing bodies would not be
available to instruct parents as to how to act on matters within their discretion or
273parental judgment. Even a formal trustee's power to exercise his discretion over the
trusteeship is afforded presumptive deference and remains beyond review except to the
extent that its exercise is inconsistent with duties to the beneficiary. Only those
decisions that constitute an abuse of trust-such as those that suggest self-dealing or
involve a potential conflict of interest-would require review before implementation.
As Scott and Scott recognized, "the unique features of th[e] familial bond" require
adaptation of agency theory and trust law.274 In applying trust law to the parent-child
relationship, I would suggest that it is necessary to appoint a third-party decision
maker, other than a court, to resolve conflicts with respect to medical decision making.
As the Court recognized in Parham, medical professionals are far better equipped than
untrained judges to make medical judgments.2 75 The emergence of institutional review
boards as bodies with authority to oversee the protection of human research subjects
suggests the possibility for an expert body for resolving disputes.
269. See id.
270. See id. § 77(2).
271. See id. cmt b.
272. Id. § 90(a).
273. See id. § 71 cmts. c-d.
274. Scott & Scott, supra note 218, at 2430.
275. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607-08 (1979).
[Vol. 85:955
2010] SHAPING PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER CHILDRENS' BODIES 999
Also, I would urge adoption of Scott and Scott's "parental judgment rule," a
corollary to the business-judgment rule applicable to corporate directors, which would
afford parents a "presumption of good faith and reasonable diligence in assessing
parental performance." 276 Although the business judgment rule does not normally apply
to trustees, who are held to the highest duty of loyalty among all fiduciaries, such a rule
would help ensure minimal intrusion in matters that are properly handled in the private
realm of family.
2 77
Regardless of these specifics, reference to trust law to define the parent-child
relationship illuminates a framework for restraining parental power to make medical
choices for children consistent with the nonsubordination principle. In a trust-based
construct, parents would have vast discretion over ordinary decisions concerning the
management of their children's health-power that is necessary and appropriate given
children's vulnerabilities and need for care. Parental decisions about how to address a
particular child's health and functional needs would be entitled to presumptive
deference and shielded from review except when there is an abuse of discretion or
violation of the trust. Respect for family privacy could be further protected by adoption
of a parental-judgment rule, which would afford parents a presumption of good faith.
Like that of other trustees, however, parental power would be limited by duties of
loyalty and prudence, which call into question parental choices to medically or
surgically shape a child's body that might serve the parent's interest at a cost to the
child. In such cases, a neutral third party would review the proposed procedure and
decide whether it is one that can be reserved for the child once she reaches maturity. If
the decision can be reserved, it would be reserved. If not, then the third party would
approve the intervention only if convinced that it will advance the child's interests. If a
proposed intervention was found to advance only the parent's interests or to unduly
foreclose options for the child in the future, it would be denied. In this way, trust-based
medical decision making for children would limit the parent's power to use medicine
or surgery on a child's body to serve the parent's social, cultural, or aesthetic
preferences, but would allow interventions that, in fact, serve the child's interests.
Responsibility for evaluating cases that raise the specter of self-dealing or the
possibility of conflict between the parent's duty to the child and the parent's personal
interests would fall to a neutral third party-a guardian ad litem, an ethics committee,
an institutional-review-board-like body, or a court-and unless someone other than the
parent finds convincing evidence that the proposed intervention will address the
individual child's immediate need, the intervention would be put off until the child is
able to make her own decision.
VI. SHAPING RECONSTRUCTED
Having thus defined the scope of parents' duties and responsibilities by
incorporating principles from trust law, it becomes possible to identify a principled
approach to medical decision making for children-both in general and particularly in
shaping cases--that respects children as human beings. As a practical matter, the
application of a trust-based construct to medical decision making for children would
276. Scott & Scott, supra note 218, at 2437-38.
277. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60-63 (2000); Parham, 442 U.S. at 601-02.
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change little about children's health care. Parental choice would still govern most
cases. The framework shift would call into question only the rare case in which the
parental choice conflicts, or could conflict, with the parent's trustee-like obligations to
the child. In those cases, the law would not allow on-demand modification of a child's
body. Instead, parental choice for modification would be subject to third-party review
before the modification could be implemented.
Under the trust-based construct, all of the focus shaping cases would trigger third-
party review, but the outcome of that review would not necessarily be uniform. The
outcome would depend on assessment of how the sought-after interventions would
affect the child's welfare and developing rights. Let us consider each case in turn.
Under a trust-based construct, the adoptive father's decision to elect eye-shaping
surgery for his daughter would trigger the need for third-party review because the
decision raises the specter of self-dealing and creates a conflict between the parent's
duty to child and the parent's personal interests. It is unlikely that a young child's
parent could show that the sought-after surgery-which is quite controversial, even for
adults-would advance the child's present interests to such an extent that it could
justify curtailing the child's ability to make her own decision about modifying her eye
shape as an adult. For that reason, it is unlikely that a parent would be allowed to elect
ethnic eye-shaping surgery under a trust-based construct.
By contrast, a parent's decision to use HGH on a child might well be approved by a
neutral third party depending on the particular case. Like the eye-shaping case, the
parental decision would raise the specter of self-dealing and a conflict of interest and
therefore trigger the need for someone other than a parent to review the decision before
it was implemented. Unlike a decision about eye shaping, however, which could be
preserved for the child to make as an adult, a decision to use HGH for height must be
made when the child is still too young to make a decision for him or herself. A third
party reviewing a request to use HGH would need to determine whether such decision
was one that would benefit the child-a hard case to make given the evidence of
physical harm and psychological injury generally associated with the treatment.
Nonetheless, in rare cases, a particular child's expected adult height might cause the
child lost opportunities, such as reaching the gas pedal on a car or the ability to reach
counters. It might also be shown that a particular child is already suffering from stigma
associated with small stature and that the particular child's psychological needs would
be served by the treatment. A trust-based construct makes room for intervention under
those circumstances.
Brooke Bates's parents appear to have violated their duty of prudence when they
chose to use liposuction to remove thirty-five pounds of fat from her twelve-year-old
body. The surgery put the child's health and life at risk for a short-lived aesthetic gain.
The risks were not offset by any long-term physical or psychological gain, suggesting
an absence of caution reasonably appropriate or suitable to preserving, protecting, and
enhancing the child's welfare and developing rights.278 To be sure, a reviewing body
could consider Brooke's specific situation, psychological makeup, and her position on
the desired liposuction. But unless some strong evidence supporting the procedure
came to light, it is difficult to envision its approval under a trust-based construct.
278. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRusTs § 77, cmt. b (2007).
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As trustees of her welfare and future interests, Ashley's parents would not have had
discretionary authority to modify her body in the way they did. The modifications
would clearly fall under the category of major "improvements," which were outside the
trust's terms and required third-party approval. 279 The request for the interventions
would also have raised the specter of self-dealing, as the parents may have been trading
Ashley's bodily integrity for their own gain. Having said that, however, the reality of
caring for a person with profound disabilities in a society that fails to support
caregivers and to modify itself to accommodate the needs of persons with disabilities
and their families is complex. It is quite possible that a neutral third party could reach
the same conclusion reached by Ashley's physicians and the ethics committee that
reviewed her case-that her interests would be best served by the high-dose estrogen
and hysterectomy despite their costs. Arguably, the estrogen that stunted Ashley's
growth served Ashley's interests for the reasons stated by the parents: as a person in a
small body, Ashley can be cared for at home by her aging parents, participate in family
outings, and avoid bedsores. Because estrogen would be effective in attenuating growth
only when Ashley was small, waiting to make the decision was not an option. Likewise,
a neutral third party could decide that the hysterectomy served Ashley's interests
because it reduced the risks of thrombosis and the discomfort of menstruation. As
Ashley is a person who will never be able to make her own medical decisions, the
neutral third party need not try to preserve future autonomy rights when balancing the
potential health and comfort benefits against the intrusion of the hysterectomy on
Ashley's bodily integrity. The decision about whether the hysterectomy would in fact
serve Ashley's interest would not change whether Ashley was six or twenty-six. By
contrast, it seems unlikely that a third party employing a trust-based framework would
permit a mastectomy on a six-year-old to prevent the possibility that she will develop
large, uncomfortable breasts, or because her wheelchair strap would cross over her
breasts when they develop. Although Ashley's trust did not include anticipatory
autonomy rights, it did include a right to bodily integrity. Under a framework designed,
in part, to protect a child's bodily integrity except when necessary to serve the child's
needs, a decision to cut off a part of a child's body would need to be justified by
something more than a vague fear of the future or a poorly constructed wheelchair.
VII. PRACTICAL MATTERS, LIMITATIONS, AND FINAL THOUGHTS
Allowing parents on-demand access to shaping interventions grants parents a degree
of control over their children's bodies that is inconsistent with an understanding of the
child as a complete person in an autonomous family. A trust-based construct for
medical decision making for children has several benefits over the current paradigm.
Most importantly, the trust-based construct centers on the child's welfare and needs. It
recognizes children's vulnerability and need for someone to make decisions for them
but also preserves autonomy rights for the child to exercise as an adult. At the same
time, a trust-based construct, especially one that incorporates a "parental-judgment
rule," respects the autonomy of the family unit by giving parents vast discretion over
decisions concerning the management of their children's health. The trust-based
construct is, in this way, entirely consistent with the nonsubordination principle
279. See id. § 88 cmt. b.
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because the construct respects parental authority when children are limited in their
abilities while limiting parental rights when their exercise would deny a child's
personhood and corresponding rights.
By incorporating mechanisms for review of individual cases, a trust-based
framework allows for a specific review of individual needs that is more appropriate for
medical decision making than the procedure- or intervention-specific bans that tend to
be advocated by those using a harm-based analysis. A trust-based construct is also
flexible enough to accommodate a child's developing ability to participate in his or her
own medical decision making and can be adapted to recognize the particular features
of the family bond.
The argument for incorporating a trust-based construct in medicine does little to
address the practical question of implementation, however. A trust-based construct
could support direct regulation of medical providers or parents. It could be
implemented through legislatures, regulatory bodies, or courts. Even better, it could be
used as the starting point for self-regulation in medicine. Convincing the medical
profession to change its ethos is not an easy job, however. Implementation on the
ground level will take some work and further analysis.
The trust-based construct is also limited by the way it draws the line to separate
discretionary parental decisions from decisions that merit scrutiny. The construct
distinguishes decisions that meet children's health or medical needs from those that do
not. "Health" and "medical need" are social constructs that shift over time.2"0 For
example, so-called genital correction surgery was considered necessary for the health
of intersexual children until quite recently when various providers and advocates called
that view into question. Under a trust-based construct, parental decisions for such
surgeries could be considered a matter of parental discretion or could be subject to
scrutiny depending on one's point of view on the medical question. In other words, the
trust-based construct perpetuates whatever dilemmas are created by current
understandings of health and is of little use in drawing lines to define health.
Despite its limitations, the trust-based construct speaks to relational interests
between parents and children in a way that makes room for nuanced discourse by
physicians, ethicists, and lawmakers about the limitations on parental power over
children's bodies. Its adoption as a conceptual framework would change medicine for
the better by limiting the ability of parents and doctors to shape children's bodies for
the parents' own purposes. It would also recognize and help doctors understand that
not every decision about a child's body is a parent's to make.
280. See ROBERTA. ARONOwrrz, MAKING SENSE OF ILLNESS: ScIENcE, SOCIETY, AND DISEASE
(1998), for a historical account of the understanding and construction of such conditions as
coronary heart disease and chronic fatigue syndrome. See also THE SOCIOLOGY AND POLITICS OF
HEALTH: A READER (Michael Purdy & David Banks eds., 2001) (chronicling constructions of
health, illness, and health care).
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